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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

ESSAYS ON FRESH VEGETABLE PRODUCTION
AND MARKETING PRACTICES
Commercial fresh vegetable production is one of the most rewarding and risky farming
activities. The price and yield variations throughout the production year, the special
characteristics of fresh vegetable produce (i.e. perishability), and the changing consumer
demands are some of the factors contributing to the increased uncertainty faced by
vegetable producers.
This dissertation combined mathematical programming and econometric techniques to:
1) investigate the optimal production and marketing practices under different price
distribution information scenarios, risk aversion levels and marketing outlets and
2) examine growers’ preferences as well the effect of risk aversion levels and
growers’ risk perception on the choice of marketing contracts.
Specifically, the following three modeling approaches were adopted in order to achieve
the dissertation objectives:
1) quadratic programming under a mean-variance framework,
2) discrete choice experiments and
3) a combination of quadratic and integer programming embodied in a meanvariance framework.
The findings indicate that optimal production practices and the resulting net returns are
substantially influenced not only by the choice of marketing channel but also by growers’
risk aversion levels as well as price knowledge. Furthermore, regarding the choice of
marketing contracts, the results highlight the existence of heterogeneity in preferences
and illustrate the importance of certification cost, in line with the previous literature.
Lastly, the findings indicate that risk aversion and risk preferences do not play a
significant role in the choice of contractual agreements by farmers.
KEYWORDS: Vegetable Marketing, Vegetable Production Practices, Integer
Programming, Quadratic Programming, Choice Experiment, Marketing Contracts
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Successful commercial fresh vegetable production is a demanding task that
requires a combination of production and marketing skills from the grower. This is a
consequence of the special attributes of fresh produce. For instance, the perishability of
fresh vegetables leads to fewer storage opportunities compared to other agronomic crops.
As a result, growers are compelled to accept the market price close to, or during, their
harvesting period. Furthermore, traditional risk mitigation options (i.e., future markets)
do not exist for fresh vegetables. Thus, growers are more vulnerable to market
fluctuations. Finally, growers need to operate in a changing market environment with
greater demand for more varieties and quality (Dimitri et al., 2003). If the vegetable
produced does not meet the required standards, then the grower has to sell at a lower
price or not at all.
The aforementioned discussion illustrates the importance of selecting the most
appropriate market outlet. Specifically, “which type(s) of market(s) to enter?” should be
among the first decisions made by a fresh vegetable grower. Adequate examination of
this topic requires consideration of several crops (herein tomatoes and sweet corn),
different markets (herein wholesale or a combination of wholesale and marketing
contracts), production practices (herein several transplanting/planting and harvesting
periods), risk aversion levels and the competition for resources across enterprises.
Despite the extensive research regarding: i) growers’ choices under uncertainty
and ii) the factors affecting the use and selection of contracts (i.e., age, education,
income, etc.) the literature sheds little light on: i) the interaction of production and
marketing practices and how they are influenced by risk aversion and ii) growers’
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preferences for contractual agreements. The present dissertation is an effort to help fill
this gap.
Specifically, the dissertation has two general objectives. First, it attempts to
answer the question of optimal marketing outlet and production timing for fresh
vegetable growers aiming to maximize net returns. Second, it examines how growers’
preferences, risk aversion levels and risk preferences affect their marketing choices. Two
marketing options are examined in this case: 1) wholesale marketing and 2) a
combination of wholesale and marketing contracts. The former has limited legal
requirements from the growers. However, the prices offered are lower, compared to other
options, and vary significantly throughout the production year. Participation in a
marketing contract, on the other hand, is more demanding from the grower but offers
more stable prices.
In order to achieve these objectives, mathematical programming and econometric
techniques are employed. The present dissertation follows a three-essay format. Each
manuscript can be considered as an extension of the previous one with increased
complexity. Thus, although separate from each other, the three manuscripts are
complementary. This approach allows the investigation of several aspects of fresh
vegetable marketing and production practices. Furthermore, it enables comparison of
results among different scenarios and estimation techniques. A discussion of the three
manuscripts follows.
1.1 Chapter Initiatives
The second chapter has two main objectives. First, it investigates the effect of
price variability, yield variability and risk aversion on the choice of optimal production
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timing for wholesale marketing. Second, it examines the impact of price seasonality
consideration on the optimal production practices and economic outcomes. The focus
area is Fayette County, Kentucky (KY), one of the top vegetable producing counties in
the state. Two crops are examined: 1) tomatoes and 2) sweet corn. These two are the top
vegetables produced in KY both in terms of acres and number of farms. A hypothetical
five-acre vegetable producer is used as the case study.
A combination of biophysical simulation and whole farm modeling is used to
answer the research question. Specifically, a resource allocation mean-variance quadratic
formulation is employed to examine the role of price, yield variability and growers’ risk
aversion on optimal production timing. Wholesale marketing is the examined market
outlet.
The focus of the third chapter shifts to grower preferences for marketing
contracts. Discrete choice modeling is employed to answer this research question. The
main data source is a mail survey administered to 315 wholesale tomato growers in four
states: 1) Illinois, 2) Indiana, 3) Kentucky and 4) Ohio. The effect of eight contract
attributes (early price, peak price, late price, early volume requirements, late volume
requirements, peak volume requirements, penalty, 3rd party safety cost), as well as the
role of growers’ risk aversion and risk preferences, are examined.
The fourth chapter provides a synthesis of the previous two under a mathematical
programming formulation. Specifically, a combination of quadratic and integer
programming, embodied in a mean-variance framework, is employed to examine the role
of growers’ risk aversion in the choice of optimal marketing mix. More precisely,
growers’ preferences between two marketing options (wholesale marketing versus a
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combination of wholesale marketing and marketing contracts) under ten risk aversion
levels are examined. Additionally, alterations in production practices required under the
different market outlets and risk aversion levels are examined.
The final chapter of the dissertation provides a summary and discussion of the
findings and methods used. Furthermore, the chapter discusses areas for future research.

Copyright © Michael Vassalos 2013
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Chapter 2: Optimal Land Allocation and Production Timing for Fresh Vegetable
Growers under Price and Production Uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
Growers’ decisions (i.e. choice of inputs, land allocation, production mix, etc.) in
the uncertain environment created by production and price variability are a subject that
has attracted scholars for more than five decades. Mapp et al. (1979) and Babcock et al.
(1987) provide a discussion and review of the early research endeavors in this topic.
Following the work of Chavas and Holt (1990), growers’ risk behavior became an
important element in the study of their allocation choices (i.e. Liang et al., 2011; Nivens
et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2001).
In addition to the production and price variability, fresh vegetable growers face
increased uncertainty due to the special characteristics of their product. For instance, the
high perishability of most fresh produce results in limited storage opportunities; thus, the
vegetable supply in the short run is highly inelastic (Sexton and Zhang, 1996; Cook,
2011). As a result, growers are compelled to accept the price during or close to the
harvesting period. Consequently, plant and harvest timing plays an important role in the
income received from vegetable production. Furthermore, the impact of quality on the
prices of fresh vegetables should not be understated. Specifically, if the vegetable
produced does not reach the quality standards expected by the buyer (i.e. consumers,
retailers, intermediaries, etc.) then the growers have to accept a lower price (Hueth and
Ligon, 1999).
Despite an abundance of research regarding growers’ decisions under uncertainty
and the increased risk faced by vegetable growers, the literature regarding how 1)
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growers’ risk aversion levels and 2) consideration of price seasonality1 impact the
production decisions, particularly timing of planting and harvest, is limited2. The research
presented is an effort to fill this gap.
The objectives of this study are threefold. First, the study seeks to develop a dual
crop vegetable farm model with a land allocation and production timing decision
interface focusing on economic optimization. Second, it examines the effect of
price/production variability and of growers’ risk preferences on their decisions regarding
the optimal production practices (land allocation, transplant timing). Third, the study
investigates potential alterations in optimal production practices and in the economic
results with and without considering seasonal price trends, a factor that may influence
growers’ production timing decisions. Mathematical programming modeling in
conjunction with biophysical simulation techniques will be used to achieve these goals.
The focus area for the present paper is Fayette County, Kentucky. The following
two reasons dictated the selection of Fayette County as study region: i) it is among the
top vegetable producing counties in Kentucky (2007 Census of Agriculture) and ii) the
abundance and availability of weather and soil data. These data are essential requirements
for the biophysical simulation.
Kentucky was ranked 42 out of 50 states within the U.S.A. based on the 2010
value of farm cash vegetable receipts. However, the importance of vegetable crops in the
overall agricultural economy of the state is rising. Two facts highlight the growing role of
vegetable production in Kentucky. First, in contrast to the overall decline of farm
numbers in the state, there is an increase in the number of farms with some type of

1
2

Price seasonality is defined as the price patterns occurring within a “crop marketing period”
A notable exception is Simmons and Pomareda (1975)
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vegetable crop from 1,086 (1997) to 2,123 in 2007 (2007 Census of Agriculture). Second,
there is a steady growth in the annual farm cash receipts from $8.7 million (1997) to
$24.7 million in 2007 (USDA/ERS Vegetables and Melon Outlook).
The latter fact indicates an additional opportunity for enhanced growth, since it
represents a 51% increase in cash receipts per acre over a 10 year period, which
annualizes to a modest growth of just over 4% annually or slightly more than the inflation
rate. Looking at the demand side, the percentage of adults who consumed vegetables
three or more times per day in Kentucky is higher than the national average (29.4%
compared to 26%, Centers for Disease Control Prevention, 2010). This increased demand
is coupled with growing interest among consumers for local products, due in part to the
success of the Kentucky Proud program. These factors highlight a great range of
opportunities for benefiting producers.
Tomatoes and sweet corn are the crops included in the whole farm economic
model. These vegetables were selected because they are among the top vegetables
produced in Kentucky, both in number of farms and in acres. Specifically, sweet corn
was ranked first among vegetables in terms of acres and second in number of farms.
Tomatoes were ranked first in terms of farm number and third in acres planted (2007
Census of Agriculture). In addition to their overall importance in the agricultural sector of
Kentucky, tomatoes and sweet corn were selected because growers can easily rotate
among them (Coolong et al., 2010).
The comparison of economic outcomes and the estimation of optimal production
timing for vegetables, with and without consideration of seasonal price trends, constitute
the main contribution of the study to the literature. Furthermore, it is among the first
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research endeavors that utilize the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer
(DSSAT) to overcome data limitations for economic studies that include multiple
vegetables.
2.2 Data Collection and Yield Validation
The present section has the following three objectives: 1) discuss the biophysical
simulation model used for the estimation of yield data, 2) illustrate how the biophysical
simulation model was validated and 3) describe the sources of data used in the study.
2.2.1 Yield Data Estimation
One interesting strand of the applied economic/agricultural literature relates to
efforts made by scholars with the goal of developing the most accurate possible model for
yield forecasting. Two of the most widely cited techniques for yield forecasting are
statistical regression equations and simulation methods (Walker, 1989; Kauffmann and
Snell, 1997). The advantages and shortcomings of these two approaches have been
widely discussed (Walker, 1989; Kaufmann and Snell, 1997; Tannura et al., 2008; Jame
and Cutforth, 1996). Among the advantages of the biophysical simulation3 are: i) that
there is no need to specify a functional form, ii) it can provide yield data for different
weather and production practices, iii) the use of biological principles for crop growth and
iv) the use of shorter time periods to estimate growth. However, it is more difficult to use
simulation techniques for large geographical areas and there is no incorporation of
historical yield data.
A lack of yield data for the examined vegetables, the need to estimate the effects
of different production practices and soil types on yields, the focus on a specific
geographical area and the overall objective of using these data for economic modeling
3

Biophysical simulation is a special case of the simulation models (Musser and Tew, 1984)
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suggest the use of biophysical simulation as the most appropriate yield estimation
technique for the present study (Dillon et al. 1991).
Biophysical simulation techniques have been extensively applied in the literature
(e.g. Shockley et al., 2011; Deng et al., 2008; Archer and Gesch, 2003; Barham et al.,
2011). Among the several biophysical models that have been developed and used, the
present study will utilize the Decision Support System (DSSAT v 4.0, Hoogenboom et
al., 2004; Jones et al., 2003). DSSAT was selected for the following reasons: i) it is well
documented, ii) it has been used and validated in numerous studies over the last 15 years
and iii) it is well suited for the present study since it incorporates modules for the two
examined vegetables (tomatoes and sweet corn).
The minimum data set required in order to generate yield estimates using DSSAT
include weather data, soil data and production practices information for the examined
region (Fayette County, Kentucky). Daily weather data for 38 years (1971-2008)4 were
obtained from the University of Kentucky Agricultural Weather Center. The data set
includes information regarding daily minimum/maximum temperature and rainfall. The
weather data collection was finalized with the calculation of solar radiation from DSSAT
weather module.
Soil data were gathered from the National Cooperative Soil Survey of NRCS.
According to the soil maps the most common soil type in Fayette County is silt loams.
Following Shockley (2010), the percent slopes from the soil maps are used as a criterion
for distinguishing between deep and shallow soils. Specifically, if the slope is between
0% - 6% then the soil is characterized as deep. If the slope is between 6% - 20% then the
soil is characterized as shallow. Based on these scales, 65% of the land is classified as
4

These years of weather data were available when the biophysical model of the study was constructed
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deep silt loam and 35% as shallow. Furthermore, the default soil types of DSSAT were
modified to better depict the characteristics of Fayette County soil conditions. Soil color,
runoff potential, drainage and percent soil slope were among the parameters modified.
Table 2.1 reports the exact specifications of the used soil types. Last but not least, the
seasonal analysis option of DSSAT is used for the yield simulation. Under this option the
soil water conditions, nutrients and organic matter are reset to initial levels every year on
January 1.
Information about the typical production practices for the vegetables considered
in the study is obtained from the University of Kentucky Extension Service Bulletins
(Coolong et al.; 2010). Tomatoes in the examined region are transplanted from early May
(spring crop) through early August (fall crop). Regarding sweet corn, planting period
extends from April 20 to July 20. In addition, 65 to 80 days after transplant and 70 to 95
days after planting are the typical harvest periods for tomatoes and sweet corn
respectively. Including all the combinations of transplanting/planting days and harvesting
periods requires modeling for 9,5005 treatments, the inclusion and evaluation of such is
beyond the scope of this study. The production practices examined here included eight biweekly transplanting days for tomatoes (starting May 1) and ten weekly planting days for
sweet corn (starting April 25). Four, weekly harvest periods for each crop were initially
included in the model6.

5

(120 transplanting days*15 harvesting days for tomatoes)+(120 planting days for sweet corn*25
harvesting days)* 2 for the 2 soil types examined
6
63, 70, 77, 84 days after transplant for tomatoes and 70, 77, 84 and 91 days after planting for sweet
corn.
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2.2.2 Yield Validation
Due to data limitations7, two non-statistical validation methods were used in the present
paper. First, the estimated yields were presented to Dr. Timothy Coolong8 and he was
asked whether or not they were a reasonable representation of expected yields in Central
Kentucky for the crops evaluated based on his observations and experience. Some
parameters of the biophysical model (i.e. fertilizer levels, irrigation, etc.) were modified
based on his recommendations. For instance, based on the simulated yield results and on
Dr. Coolong’s suggestions, three harvest periods (63, 70, 77 days) for tomatoes and one
(84 days) for sweet corn are kept in the final model formulation9 instead of the four
initially included. One cultivar was examined for each of the two crops because only one
was available from DSSAT v4. Detailed information regarding the production practices
included in the model is reported in Table 2.2. The simulated yields were considered
higher than what an average vegetable grower can achieve but not unreasonable for the
best producers. Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for the simulated yields.
Second, the simulated yields were compared with findings from previous studies.
Specifically, for tomatoes, consistent with past research (i.e. Hossain et al.; 2004,
Huevelink; 1999, Schweers and Grimes; 1976) the simulated yields are substantially
influenced by transplant period. Furthermore, consistent with the aforementioned studies
simulated yields had approximately a bell shaped form (Figure 2.1). Similarly, in
agreement with previous research for sweet corn (Williams, 2008; Williams and
Linquist, 2007), our findings illustrate that planting date plays an important role in

7

The historical yield data available was too limited to do a validation through regression.
Extension Vegetable Specialist, Assistant Extension Professor, University of Kentucky.
9
84 days harvest period for tomatoes and 70, 77 and 91 days for sweet corn are excluded from the final
formulation since the simulated yields, for these periods, are not achievable in the examined area.
8
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production, with yield decreasing substantially during later planting periods (Figure 2.2).
There is no comparison of absolute values between the simulated yields and yields in the
previous studies due to the differences in soil and weather conditions.
Finally, the simulated yields were compared with four experimental trials for
tomatoes (Rowell et al.; 2004, Rowell et al., 2005; Rowell et al., 2006; Coolong et al.,
2009) and one for synergistic sweet corn (Jones and Sears, 2005) conducted in Fayette
County and Eastern Kentucky respectively. Regarding tomatoes, the biophysical
simulation results compare favorably to the highest yielding cultivars. For sweet corn, the
average simulated yields are slightly lower than the best yellow cultivar of the
experimental trial.
2.2.3 Economic and Resource Data Estimation
In addition to the data requirements for the biophysical simulation model the
following supplementary data were needed in order to achieve the objectives of the
present study: 1) price data for the examined vegetables, 2) suitable field hours per day,
3) land availability, 4) input requirements and input prices.
Weekly price data for 13 years (1998-2010) were obtained from the USDA
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). Specifically, the Atlanta terminal market prices
are used. AMS terminal market reports are created using price data on vegetables traded
at the local wholesale markets for 15 major cities. The price information is received by
wholesalers for vegetables that are of “good merchantable quality” (USDA, 2012). The
tomato data set used in the study includes information for different variety (mature
greens, immature greens, vine-ripe), crop size (medium, large, extra-large) and package
size (20 and 25 pound boxes). However, DSSAT v 4.0.2 does not differentiate yield
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based on product variety and tomato size. In order to overcome this difficulty, following
Dr. Coolong’s recommendations, two assumptions are made: i) 90% of yield is assumed
to be mature green (the rest 10% is immature greens or vine ripes) and ii) the simulated
yield is divided in three sizes based on the following distribution: 15% medium, 60%
large and 25% extra-large. The prices were transformed in a $/pound base. Considering
that the price data set provides limited information regarding quality and the same is true
for the biophysical simulation model, no specific quality assumptions are made. Thus, the
whole harvest (after a 20% reduction for cull tomatoes) was considered of good
merchantable quality. For sweet corn, prices are transformed in a $/dozen basis. The price
set used is for yellow sweet corn.
Since there was a yearly trend detected in the price data set, in order to avoid
overestimating the price variance, the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter is used to remove
the trend movements. Following Ravn and Uhling (2002), a smoothing parameter (λ) of
6.25 is used. Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for the price data set. The combination
of 13 years of price data with 38 years of simulated yield generates 494 (13*38) different
states of nature. This approach for determining the underlying revenue distribution
assumes a perfectly competitive environment wherein the producer does not impact
prices received. Furthermore, it is consistent with low correlation between prices and
yield calculated for the data used.
Field conditions dictate whether or not a given time is suitable for fieldwork.
Following Shockley et al. (2011), the probability of not raining more than 0.15 inches per
day over weekly periods for the 38 years of weather data available is first calculated. This
probability was multiplied with the days worked in a week and the hours worked in a day
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to determine expected suitable field hours per week. The land constrained was set at 5
acres based on information obtained from the 2010 Kentucky Produce Planting and
Marketing Intentions Grower Survey and Outlook (Woods, 2010).
The Mississippi State Budget Generator (MSBG) is used to estimate weekly labor
requirements and input cost per acre for tomatoes and sweet corn. MSBG is a software
tool (Laughlin and Spurlock, 2007) developed by Mississippi State University that
utilizes machinery costs, input prices (i.e. fertilizes, fuel etc.) and labor cost to calculate a
per acre cost for a field operation (Ibendhal and Halich, 2010). For the present study, the
2012 vegetable budget files of MSBG were modified to depict the Fayette County
specifications. In detail, input requirements and prices were modified following the
suggestions of Dr. Coolong and the 2008 vegetable budget developed by the University
of Kentucky extension service publications10. A detailed representation of the included
costs is reported in Table 2.4.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
This section will provide the theoretical background for the economic model that
will be implemented in the study. Whole farm economic analysis has been used by
scholars to answer important questions such as: What is the optimal crop mix? Should I
invest in new technologies? What is the best rotation strategy? A review of related work
is presented by Lowe and Preckel (2004).
An interesting modeling aspect of the whole farm analysis is associated with the
efforts made to incorporate risk in the objective function. Among the most frequently
implemented techniques to cope with this issue is the mean-variance (E-V) formulation
originally developed by Markowitz (1952). One of the following conditions must be
10

Available at http://www.uky.edu/Ag/CDBREC/vegbudgets08.html
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satisfied in order for the results of E-V analysis to be equivalent to expected utility
theory: i) the utility function of the decision maker is quadratic, ii) normal distribution of
outcomes (net returns), iii) Meyer’s location-scale (L-S) condition (Dillon, 1992). The
first two conditions are overly restrictive and have well documented theoretical
deficiencies. For instance, quadratic utility functions have the unrealistic characteristics
of wealth satiation and increasing absolute risk aversion (Bigelow, 1993).
Considering the previously mentioned limitations the more general L-S condition
is adopted for the present study. Since yields and price for sweet corn and tomatoes are
the stochastic elements of net returns it is sufficient to illustrate that they satisfy the L-S
condition. Following Dillon (1992) a sufficient condition to meet the L-S requirements is
for the ranked yields to be linear function of one another. The minimum correlation for
the ranked yields was 97% and for ranked prices 87%. Thus, the use of mean variance
analysis is considered legitimate for this study. Quadratic programming is commonly
used to produce efficient E-V frontiers. The present study utilizes a formulation
consistent with Freund (1956).
2.4 Empirical Framework
This section will discuss in detail the formulation of the economic model that is
used in this paper. Specifically, an E-V formulation will be implemented to depict the
economic environment of a hypothetical fresh vegetable farm in Fayette County,
Kentucky. In line with Dillon (1999), the proposed model incorporates accounting
variables as well as endogenous calculation of net returns variance instead of a variancecovariance matrix.
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The objective of the grower is the maximization of net returns above selected
variable costs less the risk aversion coefficient multiplied by the variance of net returns.
The hypothetical farm is assumed to have five acres of cropland available and grow
tomatoes and sweet corn in rotation with 50% of acres in any year devoted to each crop.
This represents a two year crop rotation which is commonly followed by growers in the
examined region (Coolong et al., 2010). This will lead to a maximum of 2.5 acres with
tomatoes, which is close to the average acres cultivated with tomatoes in Kentucky
reported from an unpublished survey of wholesale tomato growers (Vassalos et al.,
2012). Rotation is required to prevent pathogen build up in the soil and control certain
insects such as corn rootworms (Coolong et al., 2010). In addition to land limitation and
rotation, the model includes the following constraints: i) labor resource limitation, ii)
sales balance by crop and year, iii) input purchases by input, iv) net return balance and v)
ratio of soil type. The final constraint guarantees that production practices will be
distributed across both soil depths.
The model will be estimated for the following two scenarios: 1) the grower
considers seasonal price trends and 2) the grower considers only annual price trends. The
aforementioned scenarios do not necessarily reflect growers with different price
information knowledge. They examine the conscious decision of a grower to adjust, or
not, the production timing decisions based on the historical price trends. More precisely,
the seasonal price trend scenario incorporates an interaction of seasonal price movement
with yield differences associated with the alternative production practices examined.
The reason for examining these two scenarios vis-à-vis lies on the importance of
production timing discussed earlier. Presumably, one of the factors that can drive optimal
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timing decisions is whether or not the growers consider historical price trend information.
This is especially true for fresh vegetable marketing which is characterized by substantial
price seasonality (Figure 2.3).
The thirteen years of weekly price data for tomatoes and sweet corn from AMS
are employed for the estimation of the first scenario (seasonal trends). A two-step
experimentation process is adopted for the latter scenario (yearly trends). First, the
optimal management decisions are identified when only considering the annual average
price for each AMS year. Second, these optimal decisions are imposed in the
optimization model with the complete weekly historical price information to ascertain
actual economic outcome. It is important to mention that the model in the present study is
a steady state equilibrium model and that the decision variables do not alter by state of
nature under both scenarios.
In addition to the risk neutral case, the two specifications of the model (with and
without full price information) were estimated for nine different risk aversion
coefficients. These coefficients were calculated using the McCarl and Bessler (1989)
approach. Based on this approach, a grower is said to maximize the lower limit from a
confidence interval of normally distributed net returns. Each one of the nine examined
levels in this study corresponds to a 5% increment from the previous level, starting from
50% (risk neutral) and ending with 95%. The mathematical specification of the model
follows:
The grower’s objective is to maximize net returns above selected variable costs less the
risk aversion coefficient multiplied by the variance of net returns and is given by:
2.1
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Subject to: land availability constraint, given by:
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Expected profit balance is given by:
2.9
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Where, activities include:
: Expected net returns above
selected variable cost
, , , : Production of crop C,
under transplanting/planting
period D, harvesting period H and
soil depth S
, : Purchases of input I
: Net returns above selected
variable cost by year
, ,
, : Tomato sales
by size (medium, large, extralarge in pounds and sweet corn
sales in dozens of ears by week
and year respectively

Indices include:
C: Crop
S: Soil depth
TS: Tomato Size
(medium, large, extralarge). There is only one
size for sweet corn.
H: Harvesting period (1
for sweet corn)
YR: Year
D: Transplant date for
tomatoes, Planting date
for sweet corn
WK: Week
I: Input
N: State of Nature
(13*38)
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Coefficients include:
Φ: Risk aversion
Coefficient
,
, : Weekly price for
different tomato sizes in $/pound and for
sweet corn in $ per ear
, , , , : Expected yield of tomatoes
by size in pounds and of sweet corn by
ears
: Available field days per
week
: Rotation matrix by crop C
:
Weekly
price in $/pounds per
,
,
tomato size and in $/ear for sweet corn
" " : Ratio of total acres
allocated to depth S

2.5 Results
The results obtained from the mean-variance quadratic formulation, in
conjunction with a discussion about them, are presented in this section. Tables 2.5 and
2.6 report results for three of those nine risk levels: low (65% significance level), medium
(75% significance level) and high (85% significance level) risk aversion, as well as the
risk neutral case. The selection of the above mentioned risk aversion attitudes was made
in order to better depict the changes that take place in the optimal decisions (i.e.
transplant/plant and harvest timing) and the economic outcomes as the risk aversion level
increases.
2.5.1 Optimal Production Management Results
In order to achieve the best possible economic outcome, and reduce their risk
exposure (if they are risk averse), growers need to take into consideration production
timing. This is especially true for fresh vegetable production where even the most basic
decisions, such as when to plant, can lead to significant improvement or decline of
economic results due to: i) the price variability and ii) the seasonal and perishable
attributes of fresh produce. Table 2.5 reports the model results regarding three possible
production strategies: i) land allocation/production mix, ii) planting schedule and iii)
harvesting schedule.
As far as land allocation choice is concerned, due to the rotation constraint, 50%
of the available acres are devoted to tomato production and 50% to sweet corn for all risk
aversion levels and for both scenarios examined. Furthermore, all the available acres
(five) are used by the hypothetical farm.
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Regarding the optimal transplant/plant and harvest timing, two strategies are
observed from Table 2.5, depending on risk aversion levels. Under the seasonal price
trend consideration scenario, a risk neutral grower who seeks to maximize expected net
returns should focus on a combination of late tomato transplanting (July 10, July 24) and
late sweet corn planting (June 21), as well as late tomato harvest (77 days after
transplant). Under this plan the grower can receive higher prices, on average, for
tomatoes and sweet corn.
As risk aversion levels increase and growers are willing to accept lower but more
certain net returns, two risk mitigating strategies are suggested from the findings. First,
risk averse growers should focus on an earlier tomato transplanting period compared to
risk neutral farmers (June 12 instead of July 24). Specifically, the higher the risk aversion
level the greater the transition to earlier period is observed in terms of acres cultivated
with tomatoes (Table 2.5). This transition indicates a movement from a focus on higher
prices to focus on higher yields and more stable prices. Specifically, the price coefficient
of variation drops from 19% (July 24, 77 days harvest) to 10% (June 12, 77 days harvest)
and the weighted average price declines from approximately $16.30 per 25 pound box to
$13.40.
A Similar strategy (transition to earlier planting period for a risk averse grower
compared to risk neutral) is observed for sweet corn (Table 2.5). In antithesis to tomato
production, the land allocation for sweet corn does not change further with higher risk
aversion levels. Besides reducing the price variation, an additional benefit of earlier
planting for sweet corn is the reduced ear worm pressure.
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In contrast to the first scenario, the second model formulation (where the grower
has limited knowledge of the price set or consciously decided not to use the whole price
information) findings indicate only minor changes in production schedule as risk aversion
levels increase (Table 2.5). Specifically, tomato transplant and sweet corn planting
periods remain the same across all four risk aversion level with a small increase of acres
devoted to later transplanting periods (June 26) for higher risk coefficients. Last but not
least, for both formulations the number of transplanting dates for tomatoes increases from
two to three for the highest risk aversion level in seeking production practice
diversification.
Regarding tomato harvesting, the model always recommends as the optimal
schedule harvesting 77 days after transplant (Table 2.5). The higher yields and prices
associated with these periods (in contrast with 63 and 70 days after transplant) explain
this choice (Figures 2.1, 2.2).
2.5.2 Economic Results
The economic results associated with the previously mentioned production
strategies are reported in this section. As can be seen from Table 2.6, the average net
returns above selected variable costs, the coefficient of variation and the minimum
possible net returns vary substantially between the different risk aversion levels and
among the two model formulations.
Risk neutral growers under the full within season price distribution
knowledge/consideration scenario have an average net return above selected variable
costs of $85,382 combined with a coefficient of variation (C.V.) of 24.52%. As the level
of risk aversion increases, in line with the underlying theory, a decline in both average
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net returns and C.V. is noticed. For instance, the mean net returns for a highly risk averse
grower correspond to 88% of the risk neutral case, while those for the low risk aversion
scenario corresponded to 96%. However, the risk neutral case is associated with higher
levels of standard deviations and coefficient of variation (almost 7% greater than the
highly risk averse case).
The importance and impact of a farm manager’s conscious consideration of price
seasonality is investigated as a primary objective of this study. This is accomplished by
calculating the economic outcomes that would result from a suboptimal solution ignoring
the weekly fluctuation in prices. This depicts a more naïve production strategy that
disregards within season price variation. Results provide evidence to support the
importance of timing both in terms of enhanced profitability and greater potential for risk
management.
As can be seen from Table 2.6, a risk neutral grower who schedules production
timing with consideration of weekly price variation enjoys 15% higher expected net
returns compared to one who disregards the ability to exploit production timing based on
price information. Furthermore, a greater opportunity to manage risk is permitted for the
former hypothetical grower. Specifically, under the first scenario the coefficient of
variation (C.V.) ranges from 17% to 24.7%. On the other hand, under the second
scenario, C.V. has a substantially reduced span from 17.14% to 17.56% with the
interesting finding that higher risk aversion levels are associated with higher C.V. in
contrast to the initial expectations. These findings validate the hypothesis that growers
who decide to plan production without consideration of seasonal price variation have
limited opportunities to manage risk.
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Finally, a comparison of the estimated net returns above selected variable costs
with a 2008 vegetable budget (Crop Diversification & Biofuel Research & Education,
University of Kentucky) resulted in some thought provoking observations. Specifically,
the estimated net returns (on a per acre basis) are from 1.5 (highly risk averse) to two
times (risk neutral) greater than the ones reported on the 2008 vegetable enterprise
budget. This difference can be attributed to the combination of the conservative
price/yield estimations of the extension service in contrast to the higher prices (obtained
from the Atlanta AMS) and yields (from the biophysical simulation) used in the study.
However, the findings of the study are closer to the estimations of Rowell et al. (2006)
who indicate that for the best tomato cultivars that season it is possible to achieve close to
$16,000 per acre.
2.6 Conclusions
The present study combines biophysical simulation and mathematical
programming modeling to develop and economic model that will provide some
guidelines regarding the optimal production mix and planting decisions for vegetable
production. The area of study was Fayette County, Kentucky and the enterprises of
tomatoes and sweet corn were evaluated.
Considering the importance of production timing, due to the perishability of
vegetable production, and the role that seasonal price trends consideration may play in
optimal transplant/planting and harvesting schedules, two distinct scenarios are
examined. Under the first, the hypothetical grower plans production timing considering
weekly price variation, while, under the second one the grower chooses a simpler but less
complete focus of annual price trends only. Three risk aversion levels are examined for
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each scenario. The findings indicate that vegetable producers have the potential to
improve their economic results if they follow a structured farm management plan.
Specifically, under the first formulation (full price knowledge) growers can achieve
average net returns that are from 4% to 15% higher than the ones from the second
formulation (not full price knowledge). Furthermore, they have greater opportunity to
manage risk.
Limitations of this study are primarily associated with the nature of the
biophysical simulation model used. Specifically, yield estimations were made only for
one variety and there are no calibrations for locally grown cultivars. Examination of
different varieties may lead to different results, considering the different performance
each variety has under different weather patterns and soil conditions. In addition to
including more vegetables in the model, future work can investigate how the results are
affected when multiple markets are examined simultaneously.
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Figure 2.1: Simulated Tomato Yields11
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Source: Biophysical simulation results
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The graph depicts average tomato yields across years and soil types
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Figure 2.2: Sweet Corn Yields12
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The graph depicts average sweet corn yields across years and soil types
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Figure 2.3: Fresh Tomatoes Monthly Producer Price Index (1982=100)
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Source: USDA, ERS Fresh Tomato Monthly Producer Price Index, U.S. Tomato Statistics

Table 2.1: Soil Characteristics
Soil
Color Drainage

Runoff
Potential
Brown Moderately Lowest
Well

Deep Silty
Loam
(65%)
Shallow
Brown Somewhat
Silty Loam
Poor
(35%)
Source: Shockley, 2010

Slope Runoff
(%)
Curve #
3
64

Moderately 9
Low

29

80

Albedo Drainage
rate
0.12
0.4
0.12

0.2

Table 2.2: Summary of Production Practices Used in the Biophysical Simulation Model
1) Tomato Production Practices
Transplanting date
May 1, May 15, May 29, June 12, June 26,
July 10, July 24, August 7
Harvesting period
63, 70, 77 days after transplant
Cultivar
BHN 66
Actual N/week (lbs/acre)
10
Irrigation
Drip irrigation, 1 inch water/week
Plant population (plants/acre)
5,000
Transplant age
42 days
Planting depth
2.5 inches
Assumptions
Dry Matter = 6%, Cull ratio = 20%
2) Sweet Corn Production Practices
Planting Date
April 25, May 2, May 9, May 16, May 23,
May 30, June 7, June 14, June 21, June 28
Harvesting Period
84 days after planting
Cultivar
Sweet corn cultivar of DSSAT v. 4
Actual N/week
2 applications of Ammonium Nitrate. One
pre-plant (90 lb. actual N/acre) and a
second 4 weeks after planting (50 lb. actual
N/acre)
Irrigation
Drip irrigation, 1 inch water/week
Plant Population (plants/acre)
20,000
Planting Depth
2 inches
Assumptions
Dry matter =24%, Cull ratio= 3%, Ear
weight = 0.661 pounds
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Table 2.3: Price and Yield Summary Statistics13
TOMATO YIELDS BY SIZE (simulated)
MEDIUM LARGE
EXTRA LARGE
Average (pounds/acre)
6,580
26,321
10,967
Standard Deviation
1,976.92 7,907.67 3,294.86
Coefficient of Variation
30.00
30.00
30.00
Maximum Yield
10,425
41,700
17,375
Minimum Yield
0
0
0
TOMATO PRICES
MEDIUM LARGE
EXTRA LARGE
Average ($/25 pound boxes)
$15.04
$15.56
$16.31
Standard Deviation
3.12
3.48
3.84
Coefficient of Variation
20.00
22.00
23.00
Maximum Price ($/25 pound box)
29.55
30.58
30.70
Minimum Price ($/25 pound box)
8.99
9.77
9.68
SWEET CORN YIELD (simulated, one size)
Average (ears/acre)
12,687
Standard Deviation
6,140
Coefficient of Variation
47.00
Maximum Yield
28,579
Minimum Yield
903
SWEET CORN PRICE
Average ($/crate)
$13.04
Standard Deviation
3.94
Coefficient of Variation
30.00
Maximum Price($/crate)
33.78
Minimum Price($/crate)
6.56
Source: DSSAT model yield results, Atlanta Agricultural Market Station prices

13

The maximum and minimum yields reported on the table refer to different production practices, thus
one is not expected to add the maximum yield of medium, large and extra‐large to obtain maximum yield
per acre
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Table 2.4: Production Costs per Acre
Tomato Expenses
Type of Expense
Cost($)
Fertilizer
319.67
Herbicide
2.33
Insecticide
97.47
Seed & planting supplies
1575.08
Labor
3688.26
Machinery expenses
139.69
Other expenses (i.e. boxes) 1600.00
Interest on capital
76.00
Irrigation supplies
627.00

Sweet Corn Expenses
Type of Expense
Cost ($)
Fertilizer
194.16
Herbicide
21.16
Insecticide
208.10
Seed & planting supplies
126.00
Labor
116.58
Machinery expenses
66.76
Other expenses (i.e. crates)
580.00
Interest on capital
10.58
Irrigation supplies
410.00
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Table 2.5: Summary of Optimal Production Practices by Risk Attitude
Model 1: Seasonal Price Trend
Tomatoes14
Sweet Corn
Risk
Transplanting Acres (% of total) Planting Acres (% of total)
Levels
Date
Day
DSLa
SSLb
DSL
SSL
Risk Neutral
July 10
27.0%
14.7%
June 21 32.5%
17.5%
July 24
5.2%
2.8%
Low Risk Aversion
June 12
5.4%
3.0%
May 23 32.5%
17.5%
July 10
27.0%
14.6%
Medium Risk Aversion June 12
16.6%
9.0%
May 23 32.5%
17.5%
July 10
16.0%
8.6%
High Risk Aversion
June 12
23.0%
12.4%
May 23 32.5%
17.5%
July 10
8.4%
4.4%
July 24
1.2%
0.6%
Model 2: Yearly Trend
Tomatoes
Sweet Corn
Risk
Transplanting Acres (% of total) Planting Acres (% of total)
Levels
Date
DSL
SSL
Day
DSL
SSL
Risk Neutral
June 12
26.8%
14.4%
May 30 32.5%
17.5%
June 26
5.7%
3.0%
Low Risk Aversion
June 12
15.0%
8.2%
May 30 32.5%
17.5%
June 26
17.4%
9.4%
Medium Risk Aversion June 12
14.4%
7.8%
May 30 32.5%
17.5%
June 26
18.0%
9.8%
High Risk Aversion
June 12
14.2%
7.6%
May 30 32.5%
17.5%
June 26
16.8%
9.0%
July 10
1.4%
0.8%
Source: Economic Model Results
a
DSL stands for Deep Silty Loam
b
SSL stands for Shallow Silty Loam

14

Optimal harvesting period for tomatoes, for all the risk aversion levels and for both models, is 77 days
after tranplanting.
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Table 2.6: Net Returns by Risk Attitude
Model 1: Seasonal Price Trend
Economic
Risk
Low Risk Medium Risk
Results
Neutral
Aversion Aversion
Mean ($)
84,573
81,492
77,192
Min ($)
42,064
48,676
48,216
Standard Deviation ($) 20,939
16,914
14,120
Coefficient of Variation 24.76
20.76
18.29
Model 2: Yearly Trend
Economic
Risk
Low Risk Medium Risk
Results
Neutral
Aversion Aversion
Mean($)
71,827
71,429
71,407
Min($)
41,807
40,282
40,202
Standard Deviation ($) 12,453
12,562
12,582
Coefficient of Variation 17.34
17.59
17.62
Source: Economic Model Results

Copyright © Michael Vassalos 2013
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High Risk
Aversion
74,391
46,497
12,816
17.13
High Risk
Aversion
71,994
40,970
12,783
17.76

Chapter 3: Fresh Vegetable Growers’ Risk Perception, Risk Preference and Choice
of Marketing Contracts: A Choice Experiment
3.1 Introduction
Fresh vegetable production is a high risk farming activity. Fresh vegetable
growers, in addition to the traditional sources of risk associated with farming (i.e.,
production, price, and financial risk), face increased uncertainty due to the characteristics
of their products (Cook, 2011; Ligon, 2001; Hueth and Ligon, 1999). Some of those
characteristics include: i) the perishability of fresh vegetable products, ii) the lack of
traditional policy measures (i.e., price and income support programs) and futures
markets, and iii) the importance of quality of production.
Fresh vegetable growers have limited opportunities to mitigate this risk. A
possible option towards this goal is the adoption of marketing contracts. Marketing
contracts typically refer to a written or oral agreement between a grower and a buyer who
set a price and possible price adjustments, including quality specifications, a delivery
period schedule, and other terms of transaction (MacDonald et al., 2004; Katchova and
Miranda, 2004). Under this type of agreement, producers assume all risk related to
production (yield, quality, etc.) and input prices, but share risk related to output market
price with the buyer (MacDonald et al., 2004).
A number of arguments have been presented in the literature to explain the
increased use of contractual arrangements. First, contract agreements help both parties to
better manage risk (Wolf et al., 2001; MacDonald, 2004). Second, the
incentives/penalties embodied in a contractual agreement may act as catalysts to induce a
particular behavior, i.e. provide better product quality (Hueth and Ligon, 1999; Wolf et
al., 2001). Calvin et al. (2001) highlighted several reasons that shippers have for
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contracting. Among the most important ones, according to ERS marketing study
interviews (Calvin et al., 2001) are the secured markets and the maintenance of future
relationships with buyers. Last but not least, contractual arrangements can help growers
and buyers in their resource allocation decisions due to the predictability introduced into
production (Hueth et al., 1999).
Although extensive research has been conducted regarding several aspects of
contractual agreements in agriculture, the literature regarding estimation of growers’
preferences and their willingness to accept/pay for different marketing contracts attributes
is limited. A notable exception is Hudson and Lusk (2004), who used discrete choice
experiments (DCE) to estimate the marginal values of six attributes (expected income,
price risk shifted, autonomy, asset specificity, provision of inputs, length of contract) of
hypothetical contracts using a sample of 49 growers from Mississippi and Texas. The
findings of their study indicate that risk avoidance and transaction costs play a major role
in the choice of contractual agreement. Furthermore, the study highlights the
heterogeneity of preferences among growers.
DCE analysis refers to a broad range of survey-based statistical techniques used
by scholars in order to draw inferences for important questions such as: i) consumers’
preferences, ii) tradeoffs that consumers are willing to make in order to enjoy specific
attributes, iii) how consumers may react to introduction of new products or changes in
existing ones, and iv) market-share predictions (Green et al., 2001; Louviere et al.,
2010)15. Since marketing contracts can be described in terms of several distinct attributes,
using DCE analysis in order to estimate the marginal value of them to growers is
justifiable.
15

Discrete choice experiments (DCE) are referred in Green et al. (2001) as choice based conjoint analysis.
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The objective of the study is twofold. First, the study seeks to examine growers’
preferences for a number of marketing contract attributes. Second, it investigates the
effect of growers’ risk perceptions and risk preferences on the choice of a marketing
contract agreement.
The marketing contract attributes examined include different levels of price,
volume requirements, transaction costs, and penalties. Elicitation of growers’ risk
preference is achieved with the use of a “multiple price lists” design where growers are
presented with several lottery choices and are asked to select one (Binswanger, 1980;
Bisnwanger, 1981). Growers’ risk perception is determined through a number of Likert
scale questions.
A mail survey questionnaire was used to gather data from tomato producers and
consisted of five sections. Supplementary data used included tomato prices and yields in
order to design reasonable contract options for the choice experiment. Those data were
obtained from the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service Atlanta Terminal Market and
with the use of biophysical simulation, respectively. Growers’ preferences toward
marketing contracts are estimated using mixed-logit modeling. This approach allows the
relaxation of the restrictive independence from irrelevant attributes assumption and
accounts for heterogeneity in preferences.
The use of DCE techniques to examine preferences for fresh vegetable marketing
contracts is a primary contribution of this study to the literature. In comparison with
Hudson and Lusk (2004), the present study focuses on a specific crop (tomatoes) and
group of growers (wholesale tomato growers), but the results have implications for both
growers and a broader range of stakeholders who can benefit from the insights offered by
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this study. These specifications allow the evaluation of more concrete contractual
agreements. Last but not least, it is the first effort to examine how growers’ risk
perceptions affects their choice of contracts.
The findings of the study can provide useful insights both to policy makers and to
the vegetable production industry. This is so for several reasons. Consumer interest in
locally-sourced foods has increased dramatically, and marketing contracts are one
method for commercial scale buyers and retailers to develop a reliable supply of local
produce. Thus, a better understanding of farmers’ preferences can increase the adoption
of mutually beneficial contracts. Second, information regarding farmers’ acceptance and
perceived tradeoffs between the different attributes in interaction with their risk
perception and risk preferences levels will provide useful intuition in better
understanding how different producers view this emerging market. Finally, the study will
further examine the importance of transaction costs in contractual agreements, which may
give guidance to relevant policy.
3.2 Data Collection and Survey Design
The main data source for the study is a mail survey. The survey was administered
to a sample of wholesale tomato producers in four states: Kentucky, Illinois, Ohio and
Indiana. Growers who direct market the majority of their produce were excluded from the
sample since they are less likely to operate under contractual agreements (MacDonald et
al., 2004). Mailing information for the growers was gathered from the Market Maker web
sites within these respective states, after obtaining permission to use the data base of the
site. A total of 315 mailing addresses were retrieved.
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From the 315 surveys, ten were returned for insufficient or wrong addresses and
five were no longer farmers, leading to an effective survey group of 300 growers. In
order to mitigate non-response bias problems, the three wave survey design (survey reminder - survey) proposed by Dillman (1978) was implemented. A monetary incentive
($25) was offered with the intention of boosting the response rate. The overall response
rate was 18.3% (55 returned surveys) with an effective response rate of 16.3% (49 usable
surveys). The sample size and the response rates for each state are presented in Table 3.1.
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.2.
The study sample includes a greater percentage of women operators and slightly
younger growers compared to 2007 Census of Agriculture (Table 3.2). Furthermore, the
average acres with tomatoes in the study compare closely to the average of total
harvested acres with tomatoes from the 2007 census of agriculture. The final form of the
survey questionnaire (i.e., wording, ordering of questions, etc.) is the result of several
focus group discussions with vegetable growers, extension specialists and persons
involved with marketing of fresh vegetables. Two of the major focus groups took place
during the 2011 Kentucky Farm Bureau Convention and the 2012 Kentucky Fruit and
Vegetable Trade Show.
The survey questionnaire consisted of five sections. First, general questions about
the characteristics of the farm were solicited. The next section incorporated questions
regarding growers’ perceptions and experience with marketing contracts. The third
section asked questions related to growers’ risk comfort levels. The choice experiment is
included in the fourth section. The survey concluded with questions on demographic
characteristics.
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The importance of various factors in growers’ decisions to participate, or not, in a
marketing contract agreement is also examined in the second section of the survey
instrument. More than 50% of growers indicated reduced price risk and secure income
among the most important reasons for participating in a marketing contract agreement
(Table 3.3). Considering the price volatility of fresh vegetable production, those
preferences are not surprising. Conversely, 28 out of 49 respondents indicated
unsatisfying price terms among the most important factors that may discourage them
from participating in marketing contracts. Furthermore, a significant portion of
respondents indicated that the difficulty of satisfying the quality and quantity
requirements imposed in a marketing contract may discourage them from participating in
such an agreement (Table 3.4).
Two types of questions were used to elicit growers’ risk comfort levels (third
section of the questionnaire). The first type of question was based on expected utility and
the second type consisted of a self-rating. The former approach is based on an allocation
game suggested by Gneezy and Potters (1997), Charness and Gneezy (2010) and
Binswanger (1980, 1981). This approach is used to elicit growers’ risk preference. The
latter is a series of Likert- scale questions based on Pennings and Garcia (2001). This
approach is used to elicit growers’ risk perception.
3.2.1 Conjoint Experiment and Selection of Attributes
One of the first steps required in order to conduct a DCE analysis is the choice of
product attributes and their corresponding levels that will be used in the study (Green et
al., 2001). The following includes a discussion regarding the selection of contract
attributes used in the study and of their levels.
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The focus of the study on marketing contracts and on fresh vegetable production,
in conjunction with previous literature and the discussions that took place during the
focus groups, are the main factors that influenced the selection of attributes for the choice
experiment. Under a marketing contract, in contrast to production contracts, growers bear
all the risk associated with production (yield, quality) and input prices and share some or
all of the output price risk (MacDonald et al., 2004; Ligon, 2001; Vavra, 2009). This is
depicted in the choice experiment with the inclusion of volume and quality requirements
and by eliminating possible requirements regarding varieties, production practices, etc.
In detail, the choice profiles used in the study consisted of the following eight
attributes: early period price, peak period price, late period price, early period volume,
peak period volume, late period volume, certification cost, and penalties. The first seven
attributes have three levels each and the penalties four levels. A description of these
attributes and their levels is reported in Table 3.5. In addition to the previously mentioned
contract attributes, an important requirement of the examined contracts relates to quality
of tomatoes. Specifically, the examined contracts refer to U.S.D.A. number 1 grade
tomatoes.
Based on the number of attributes and their levels, a full factorial design
corresponds to 8,748 (or 37 × 4) profiles. In order to reduce this number, a fractional
factorial design was implemented. The fractional factorial design corresponds to a sample
of the full factorial that retains the main and first order interaction effects (Louviere et al.,
2000). The %mktex macro algorithm in SAS returned 18 choice sets of two choices. In
order to minimize the time to complete the questionnaire and mitigate the fatigue of the
participants, those 18 sets were randomly distributed in groups of 6 to 3 versions taking
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care not to include a clearly superior choice. In addition to the two choices, a third “no
contract” choice was added. A sample choice experiment is reported in Figure 3.1. Each
respondent was assigned to only one version of the survey (differ only in choice sets) and
made 6 choices. As a result, a total of 49*6=294 choices are represented in the data.
The price attribute refers to the monetary amount that the contractors should pay
the growers during or before the payment deadline. Among the several price mechanisms
suggested in the literature (Hueth and Ligon, 1998; Hueth and Melkonyan, 2004; Hueth
and Ligon, 2002; Katchova and Miranda, 2004), a price per pound contingent on quality
and period of the year is adopted for the examined contracts. Following Hueth and Ligon
(1999) and Hueth and Melkonyan (2004), the payment offered depends on the tomato
price of a downstream market. Specifically, USDA-AMS tomato prices from the Atlanta
Terminal Market were used in the study as base prices. In order to capture the seasonal
price variability of tomatoes and achieve a constant supply flow, three different time
periods are used. Early period refers approximately to the period up to July 4, the peak
period covers July and August and the late period spans September and October.
Following the focus group discussion three different price levels are used for each period
(Table 3.5). The range of prices provided to growers is abstract due to the lack of data
from actual contractual agreements.
Regarding volume requirements, the scarcity of detailed yield data leads to the
use of biophysical simulation techniques. Specifically, tomato yields for thirty-eight years
under different production practices (transplant days and harvesting days) were estimated
with the use of the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT v.4,
Hoogenboom et al., 2004). Validation of the simulated yields was made based on
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previous literature (Ciardi et al., 1998; Heuvelink, 1999) and expert opinion for fresh
market tomatoes grown in Kentucky. Specifically, the model parameters and the
simulated yields were evaluated with Dr. Timothy Coolong, Extension Vegetable
Specialist at the University of Kentucky. The estimated yields were considered higher
than what an average producer may achieve but would be expected for experienced
wholesale growers. Since growers do not generally contract all of their production
(Katchova and Miranda, 2004), the volume requirements specified on the choice profiles
correspond to 10%, 15% and 20% of the average yield calculated by DSSAT for each of
the three periods (early, peak and late). Similarly with the price per pound, the range of
volume requirements is theoretical due to the lack of actual data from real contractual
agreements.
One of the most important provisions in a contractual agreement is related to the
cost that growers have to face in case they fail to meet their obligations. A grower may
face a penalty under the following two circumstances: i) failure to provide the agreed
volume and ii) failure to provide the required quality. Analogous to price mechanisms, a
number of different cost structures (penalties) have been suggested in the literature (Wolf
et al., 2001; Hueth et al., 1999). In the context of the present study, the penalties are
reported as price reductions. Four different penalty levels are used in the discrete choice
experiment of the survey: 5%, 10% and 15% of price and terminate contract. The last
option (terminate) indicates that the contract will no longer be valid and the grower will
have to sell his production in the spot market.
Considering that the price and penalty mechanisms of the examined contracts
depend on the quality of the supplied tomatoes, a quality measurement instrument is
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required in order to eliminate possible disputes among growers and buyers. A number of
different quality validation options have been suggested in the literature (Hueth and
Ligon, 1999; Wolf et al., 2001).
The certification cost attribute corresponds to the payments that growers may
have to provide for third party food-safety audits, one of the possible quality control
options. Hatanaka et al. (2005) provide a review regarding the development of third party
audits, their benefits and the challenges associated with those. Third party audits can be
an expensive quality assurance function that larger buyers may require of their fresh
produce suppliers as buyers try to manage food safety risks. Part of the challenge for
growers is the variation in certification requirements among buyers. In any case, such
audits have become a central element to the discussion regarding marketing arrangements
between growers and buyers (Hatanaka et al., 2005; Mahshie, 2009). Actual certification
costs can vary, depending on the 3rd party auditor and the buyer requirements. We used
three levels of $0 (no requirement), $500 and $1000 to represent possible associated
certification expenses based on direction from the growers in the focus groups.
As far as the expected signs are concerned, Hudson and Lusk (2004) illustrated
that increases in the expected income from contracts are positively related with the
probability of contract adoption. On the other hand, higher transactions cost lead to lower
probability of contracting. In the context of this study, the higher the price per pound
offered, the higher the expected income for the grower. Thus, the a priori expectation is
to have a positive sign associated with price per pound. Penalties and certification cost
represent the transaction costs in the examined contracts. The higher they are, the more
costly the contract enforcement, suggesting a negative influence in the adoption
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probability. Finally, the higher the volume requirements are, the more difficult it will be
for growers to satisfy the contract agreement, indicating a greater possibility of penalties.
Thus, the initial expectation regarding volume requirements is that they will negatively
influence the adoption probability.
3.3 Econometric Models
The conceptual foundation of DCE models lies on the seminal work of Lancaster
(1966). In detail, Lancaster’s theory of demand posits that consumers gain utility from
the characteristics that a good possesses rather than the “actual” good. Additionally,
McFadden’s (1974) random utility theory (RUT) provides the theoretical background that
connects consumers’ selection of an alternative and their utility (Louviere et al., 2000).
Specifically, based on RUT, an individual’s (i) utility from choosing an alternative j in
the t-th choice set can be expressed as a combination of two elements: one deterministic
and one stochastic. This can be denoted as:
3.1
where β is a vector of unobserved parameters that will be estimated, Xijt is a vector of
observed variables, and εijt is the random error term. The individual (i) will choose the
alternative j that will generate the highest utility.
The selection of the most appropriate statistical technique for the analysis of the
data (i.e., conditional logit, multinomial probit, nested logit, etc.) depends on the
assumptions that the researcher will make regarding the error term and on the
experimental design of the DCE.
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Specifically, under the assumption that the error term is independent and
identically distributed, with an extreme value Type I distribution, then the probability that
the individual (i) will choose the j alternative can be formulated as:
3.2

∑

This corresponds to the conditional logit model (MacFadden, 1974). One important
restriction associated with the conditional logit model is the assumption of independence
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) (Louviere et al., 2000).
The mixed logit model (or random parameters logit) is an extension of the basic
multinomial logit model (Train, 2003) that allows the relaxation of the restrictive IIA
assumption. Furthermore, a number of additional desirable properties of mixed logit
formulation have been discussed in the literature. First, the model accounts for
heterogeneity in preferences (Louviere et al., 2000). Second, it allows for correlation of
unobserved factors over time (Train, 2003). Third, the model does not restrict the
distribution of random components to normal. A number of other distributions can be
used, depending on the analysts’ assumptions. Lastly, the mixed logit model allows
researchers to consider the panel data nature of most repeated choice data such as in this
study.
In contrast to conditional logit, in a mixed logit model, the unobserved vector of
coefficients β varies in the population following a distribution function f (μ, v), with μ
representing the mean and v the variance of the distribution. The objective of the mixed
logit is the estimation of μ and v instead of β. As shown in Train (2003), the
unconditional choice probability of mixed logit is expressed as:
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3.3

∑

where, h(β) is the density function for the random parameters β. Due to the fact there is
no closed form solution for equation (3), the integral is calculated using simulation
techniques.
3.4 Empirical Results
The results obtained from the econometric estimation in conjunction with a
discussion of them are presented in this section. In addition to the main effects
estimation, both for conditional and mixed logit models, interaction terms between
contract attributes and growers’ risk perception and risk preferences are estimated. Two
approaches are used for the interpretation of the results. First, the statistical significance
and the signs of the coefficients are discussed. Second, a monetary interpretation based
on marginal values is provided. Following Hu et al. (2009), the marginal value (MV) in a
mixed logit model is calculated as:
3.4

∗
∗

where βattribute and βprice are the coefficients associated with a contract attribute and a price
(early, peak, late season) respectively. D is a vector of risk preference or risk perception
variables, and βattribute*D is estimated coefficient of the interaction term between attributes
and the estimated risk variables. Under the marketing contract framework examined, MV
can be generally interpreted as the amount by which the price per pound offered should
be increased or decreased in order for a grower to accept a marginal increment in one of
the contract attributes (eg. 1% increase in the penalty levels).
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The results of the basic estimation, without any interaction terms, for the
conditional and mixed logit models are reported in Table 3.6. Following the a priori
expectations and in line with Hudson and Lusk (2004), the early price ($/lb.) attribute has
a statistically significant and positive coefficient. Thus, ceteris paribus, growers show
preference for contracts offering higher price for tomatoes expecting to reach the market
early in the season (before July 4). Taking into account the greater yield risk associated
with early planting, due to weather conditions, this finding is not surprising.
The penalty and certification cost variables represent the transaction costs (cost of
monitoring and enforcement) of the examined contracts. The highly statistically
significant negative coefficients of these two attributes indicate the considerable negative
impact they have on growers’ utility. Specifically for certification cost, this negative
impact on utility can be attributed to two factors. First, growers seek to avoid higher
transaction costs, since this will result in reduced income. Second, it may indicate
growers’ reluctance to increase their dependence on quality determination from the buyer
or third party audits. Especially if there is no scientific base for this quality verification16,
the penalties may be activated easily, which would result in reduction of growers’ income
or even termination of the contract. Lastly, these findings provide further empirical
validation for the transaction cost theory (Allen and Lueck, 1995).
The random variable “no contract” represents the third alternative in the choice
sets. It is selected by growers if they would rather not choose any of the two contract
alternatives offered. For both model estimations (conditional and mixed logit), the
variable “no contract” is not statistically significant. This finding indicates that, on
average, growers do not suffer utility loss if they do not have the option to participate in a
16

i.e. it is not uncommon to have multiple demands placed in to growers (Mahshie, 2009)
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marketing contract agreement. However, under the mixed logit formulation, the standard
deviation estimate of this coefficient is statistically significant. This result, in agreement
with Hudson and Lusk (2004), indicates unobserved preference heterogeneity among
growers.
Regarding volume requirements, none of those described in this experiment
(early, peak, late period volume) had a significant impact on growers’ utility (Table 3.6).
Considering that the volume requirements included in the examined contracts do not
exceed 20% of possible yield per acre, this finding is not surprising.
The mixed logit formulation provided a slightly better fit as measured by the
McFadden R2. The incorporation of the random variable (no contract) which indicated
the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in growers’ preferences can explain this
increase.
Estimated marginal values (MV) resulting from the mixed logit formulation
indicate that, in order to accept a 1% increase in penalty levels, growers must be
compensated by $0.3/ lb. higher early price (Table 3.7). Considering the range of offered
early price in the present study is $0.62/lb. - $0.72/lb., on average, growers want 0.4%0.5% higher early price to accept 1% increase in penalty levels. Similarly, the average
MV of $0.0004 for certification cost (Table 3.7) indicated that growers must be offered a
0.05% - 0.06% higher early price in order to accept a $1 increase in the expenditures
associated with certification cost.
3.4.1 Growers’ Risk Perception, Risk Preferences and Choice of Contracts
The second objective of the study is to investigate how growers’ risk perception
and risk preferences affect their selection of marketing contracts. The present section
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discusses the techniques used to elicit growers’ risk preferences and risk perception as
well as the results from the subsequent econometric estimation.
An interesting strand of the contract literature refers to the examination of
growers’ risk preferences and whether or not these affect the choice of contracts. Thus
far, research findings regarding this issue are mixed. For instance, Ackerberg and
Botticini (2002) and Hudson and Lusk (2004) indicate that risk is an important
determinant of contract choice. On the other hand, findings from Allen and Lueck (1995,
1999) illustrate that risk preferences do not have significant impact on the choice of
contracts.
Growers’ wealth, yield coefficient of variation, and risk transferred to the buyer
are among the proxies used in the aforementioned studies to estimate growers’ risk
preferences. The present paper uses a multiple price list design, following previous work
(Binswanger, 1980; Binswanger, 1981; Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Charness and Gneezy,
2010) in order to draw inferences regarding growers’ risk preferences. Specifically, in
this experiment, growers were asked to select among two different hypothetical tomato
plant varieties. The two plants have different levels of resistance to disease and,
depending on whether or not the disease occurs, different economic returns. The
probability that a disease will occur is 50%. Growers were presented with a set of six
possible payoffs and were asked to select one (Figure 3.2).
In accordance with Binswanger (1980), higher expected returns were offered at
the cost of higher variance. The corresponding risk classification levels and the estimated
partial risk aversion coefficient are reported at Table 3.8. Under the assumption that
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growers’ exhibit constant partial risk aversion, the partial risk aversion coefficient can be
estimated using a utility function of the following form (Binswanger, 1980):
3.5

1
Where M is the certainty equivalent and S is the approximate partial risk aversion

coefficient17. In line with Lusk and Coble (2005), the measure used in the analysis as an
individual’s risk aversion coefficient (S) is the midpoint of the possible minimum and
maximum range of S18. Another alternative is to use the geometric average; however both
approaches gave similar results.
In addition to growers’ risk preferences, their risk perception is also required in
order to elicit optimal risk behavior (Lusk and Coble, 2005). Three Likert-scale questions
from Pennings and Garcia (2001) were used to elicit growers risk perception (Table 3.9).
A measure of growers’ risk perception is obtained by the sum of responses to questions
1-3 (Lusk and Coble, 2005).
After the elicitation of growers’ general risk perception and risk preferences, three
specifications of the mixed logit framework were estimated (Table 3.10). In contrast to
the main effects model, discussed previously, these specifications include grower-specific
information that will provide a better interpretation of their preferences. In detail,
growers’ general risk perception (Model 1), risk preference (Model 2), and an interaction
term between risk preferences and risk perception (Model 3) are included in the

17

In order to calculate S (Table 8) we have to solve for the indifference point among two consecutive
choices using equation 5. For instance, for choices A and B the S is calculated from the following equation:
50(1‐s) + 50(1‐s) =40(1‐s) +70(1‐s). This equation can be solved in Excel or in Mathematica after graphing the
equations to estimate where the functions crosses the x‐axes.
18
Following Binswanger (1981), for the regression analysis alternative F (Table 3.8) was given a value near
zero (0.18) and the value for alternative A was set to 2.47
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estimation as interaction terms. In all the three model formulations, the “no contract”
attribute is assumed to have a random coefficient.
The results of the three estimated models are consistent with the findings of
conditional logit and main effects mixed logit formulations, discussed previously. In
detail, certification cost and penalty have negative impact on growers’ utility, while
growers show preference for contracts with higher early price.
Furthermore, findings from Model 1 illustrate that certification cost has a higher
negative impact on utility of growers with higher general risk perception (RP) as
indicated by the highly statistically significant, negative coefficient of the interaction
term “certification cost*RP”. If selection of contracts is primarily driven by growers’
general risk perception then, in line with Hanaka’s (2005) suggestions, educational or
financial assistance can be an important element in altering growers’ behavior in favor of
marketing contract agreements.
As can been seen from Model 2 findings (Table 3.10), growers’ risk aversion
(RA) did not have any significant impact on their preferences regarding marketing
contracts. However, when the interaction term between growers’ risk perception and risk
aversion is included in the estimation (Model 3, Table 3.10), the interaction between this
term and the certification cost is statistically significant with the expected negative sign.
Marginal values based on the three previously mentioned models are also
calculated. In order to gain a better understanding of how different growers’ value
different contract attributes two levels of risk perception and risk preferences are
examined. For risk perception these values are -2 and 2 representing risk seeking and risk
averse growers. For risk aversion the selected levels are 0.5 and 2. For comparison

52

purposes, marginal values are also estimated for the average levels of risk aversion and
risk preferences.
Table 3.11 reports only the statistically significant results of these estimations. In
contrast to the results from Model 1, none of the marginal values estimations for the risk
perception interaction term are statistically significant. This finding indicates that the
effects may not be large enough to have a perceptible value. On the other hand, the higher
the growers’ risk aversion coefficient, the greater compensation (in terms of early price)
they should be offered to accept a 1% increase in penalty or a $1 increase in certification
cost.
3.5 Conclusions
The present study used discrete choice experiments in conjunction with estimation
of random utility models to investigate: i) how growers’ value different attributes of
marketing contracts and ii) how growers’ risk perception and preferences affect their
selection of marketing contracts. The main data source is a mail survey administrated to
315 wholesale tomato growers in 4 states: Kentucky, Illinois, Ohio and Indiana. Fresh
vegetable growers were selected as the sample of the present study due to the increased
sources of risk they face and the limited opportunities they have to reduce this
uncertainty.
The empirical results in line with the initial hypothesis and with previous
literature (i.e. Hudson and Lusk; 2004, Allen and Lueck; 1995) highlight the role of
transaction costs as an important determinant of contract choice. Specifically, the
findings indicate that certification cost requirements (or third party audits) have a
significant negative impact on growers’ utility concerning the selection of contracts.
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Furthermore, the findings indicate the existence of unobserved heterogeneity regarding
growers’ preferences for marketing contracts.
The effect of risk on the selection of contracts is a widely discussed topic in the
literature; however, no common consensus has been reached. The present study used a
multiple price risk game and a number of Likert scale questions to elicit growers’ risk
aversion and risk perception, respectively. In contrast with Hudson and Lusk (2004), the
results indicate that growers’ risk aversion and risk preferences have a limited impact on
growers’ selection of marketing contracts. Last but not least, buyers who wish to enter
into marketing contracts with growers need to provide a high early price, as well as
improve the determination of quality criteria, thus reducing the third party audit costs.
Future research may include larger samples and different geographic areas where
the use of marketing contracts is more common than in the examined region. If the
importance of third party audit cost in these regions, where growers are more familiar
with contracts, is lower and risk perception is still a significant determinant of choices,
then it may indicate that education can alter growers’ preferences.
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Figure 3.1: Example Choice Set
Option A
Delivery Price Volume
Penalty Certification
Period
($/lbs) (pounds/ acre/
Cost
week)
Early
$ 0.74 2,200/acre/week 5%
$1000
Peak
$ 0.53 6,000/acre/week 5%
$1000
Late

$ 0.70

5,100/acre/week 5%

Please choose only one option

Option A

$1000

Price
($/lbs)
$0.62
$0.55
$0.77

↔

Option B
Option C
Volume
Penalty Certification
(pounds/ acre/
Cost
week)
2,600/acre/week 15%
$500
I will not
5,000/acre/week 15%
$500
Choose
either A
4,300/acre/week 15%
$500
or B
Option B

↔

Option C
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Figure 3.2: Risk preferences elicitation question
Please consider the choice you would make in the following hypothetical situation:
You will be given 150 tomato plants (in 5 bundles of 30 plants each) for free, to use in
the coming season. There are two types of plants, A and B, and you can choose any
combination of the two that totals 5 bundles.
The A and B plants have different levels of resistance to tomato diseases. The A plants
have potentially higher harvests but are more vulnerable to disease. If disease does not
occur, the A plants will produce a harvest worth $30 per bundle. However if disease
occurs (50% of the time), the A plants’ harvest is worthless ($0 per bundle). The B plants
are disease-resistant and always produce a harvest worth $10 per bundle.
The following table illustrates the different combinations of type A and B plants that you
could receive, and the value of their combined harvests based on the weather. Please
check one box to indicate which combination of plants you would choose.
I choose (check
one of the six
combinations
A-F below)

Bundles of 30
type A plants

Bundles of 30
type B plants

If disease does
not occur (50%)

If disease
occurs (50%)

o

A

0

5

$50

$50

o

B

1

4

$70

$40

o

C

2

3

$90

$30

o

D

3

2

$110

$20

o

E

4

1

$130

$10

o

F

5

0

$150

$0
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Table 3.1: Registered Commercial Tomato Growers and Usable Response Rate by State
State
Registered Usable
% Usable Response Rate
Growers
Responses
Illinois
116
17
14.6 %
Indiana
53
12
22.6 %
Kentucky 50
12
24.0 %
Ohio
81
8
9.8 %
n
300
49
16.3%
Source: Market Maker, survey questionnaire
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics Associated with Commercial Tomato Growers
Variable
Average
Std.
Min.
Max.
Gender
0.24
0.43
0
1
(1=female)
(0.17)a
Age
49. 2 (56)a
12.43
30
70
Experience with
0.36
0.48
0
1
contracts (1=yes)
Household size
2.4
1.28
1
6
Household income
71,480
33,169 20,000 137,500
Education
15
2.5
5
19
Off farm employment
0.42
0.49
0
1
(1= yes)
85.5
0.125
600
Acres with Tomatoes
17.5 (17)a
n=49
Source: Survey questionnaire
a
Numbers in parenthesis come from 2007 census of agriculture for vegetables,
potatoes and melons.
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Table 3.3: Factors that Encourage Growers Participation in Marketing Contracts
Importance levels (4=most important)
Factor
Freq.
1
2
3
4
Reduced price risk
29
10.3% 20.7% 31.0% 37.9%
Secured income
39
2.6% 12.8% 41.0% 43.6%
No need to worry about supply channels 23
26.0% 39.1%
8.7% 26.1%
Access new market opportunities
31
25.8% 25.8% 25.8% 22.6%
Bonuses for better quality
19
43.4% 10.5% 10.5% 10.5%
Opportunity to sell higher volumes
30
33.3% 20.0% 20.0% 23.3%
Prior experience with contracts
8
62.5% 12.5% 12.5%
0.0%
Lower distribution cost
13
46.1%
7.7%
7.7% 15.4%
Maintenance of future relationships with 18
44.4% 16.0% 16.7%
5.6%
buyers
Other
2
50.0%
0.0%
0.0% 50.0%
Source: Survey questionnaire
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Table 3.4: Factors that Discourage Growers From Participating in Marketing Contracts
Importance levels (4=most important)
Factor
Freq.
1
2
3
4
Difficult to satisfy quality requirements 32
21.8%
28.1% 21.9% 28.1%
Unhappy with price terms
28
10.7%
10.7% 32.1% 46.4%
Severe penalties
19
15.8%
26.3% 15.8% 42.1%
Inflexibility to pursue other markets
23
34.8%
26.1% 17.4% 21.7%
Cost of enforcement
11
9.0%
36.4% 18.2% 36.4%
Bad previous experience with contracts 12
25.0%
50.0% 16.7%
8.3%
Unhappy with quality terms
19
5.3%
43.4% 26.3% 21.0%
Delivery time
17
23.5%
41.2% 17.6% 17.6%
Method of payment
12
50.0%
16.7% 25.0%
8.3%
Not enough information about contracts 18
16.7%
22.2% 22.2% 38.9%
Difficult to satisfy volume requirements 28
39.3%
14.3% 17.9% 28.6%
Not enough land
12
33.3%
16.7% 16.7% 33.3%
Other
1
100%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Source: Survey questionnair
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Table 3.5: Choice Based Experiment Attributes and Their Levels
Variable
Description
Levels
1
2
Early Price
Price offered for late June0.62
0.68
Early July ($/lb)
Peak Price
Price offered for
0.53
0.55
July-August ($/lb)
Late Price
Price offered for
0.70
0.77
September – October ($/lb)
Early Volume
Volume requirements for
2,200 2,400
Late June- Early July
(lbs./acre)
Peak Volume
Volume requirements for
5,000 5,500
July- August (lbs./acre)
Late Volume
Volume requirements for
4,300 4,700
September- October
(lbs./acre)
Penalties
Price reduction if the
5%
10%
contract agreements are not
satisfied (% of price)
0
500
Certification
3rd party audit cost
Cost
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3
0.74

4

0.58
0.84
2,600
6,000
5,100
15%
1000

Terminate

Table 3.6: Main Effect Conditional and Mixed Logit Estimations
Conditional Logit
Mixed Logit
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient
Std. Error
Early Price
3.546*
1.960
3.683*
2.125
Peak Price
3.902
4.748
5.138
5.317
Late Price
0.569
1.690
1.427
1.891
Early Volume
-0.000
0.000
-0.000
0.000
Peak Volume
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Late Volume
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Certification Cost
-0.001***
0.000
-0.002***
0.000
Penalty
-1.228***
0.288
-1.44***
0.320
No Contract
5.140
4.34
6.50
4.909
No Contract S.D.
3.208***
0.628
0.118
0.128
McFadden R2a
Adj. McFadden R2 0.090
0.089
n=49
*, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.
a
McFadden R2 is given by one minus the ratio of unrestricted to restricted
log likelihood values
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Table 3.7: Marginal Values Under Mixed Logit Model
Early Price
Peak Price
a
Mean
Std. Error Mean Std. Error
Early Volume
0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000
Peak Volume
0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000
Late Volume
0.000
0.000
0.000 0.000
Certification
0.0004* 0.0002
0.000 0.000
Cost
Penalty
0.393*
0.238
0.282 0.303
No Contract
-1.8
1.4
-1.3
0.95
* Indicates 10% significance level
a
The standard errors are estimated using the delta method.
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Late Price
Mean Std. Error
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.001
1.015
-5.3

1.351
6.86

Table 3.8: The Payoffs and Corresponding Risk Classification
Choice Low
High
Risk
Approximate
Partial Risk
Payoff
Payoff (No Aversion Classa
Aversion
(Disease disease)
Coefficient
occurs)
(S)
A
50
50
Extreme
∞ to 2.48
B
40
70
Severe
2.48 to 0.84
C
30
90
Intermediate
0.84 to 0.5
D
20
110
Moderate
0.5 to 0.33
E
10
130
Slight to Neutral
0.33 to 0.19
F
0
150
Neutral to Negative 0.19 to -∞
a

Based on Binswanger (1980) classification
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Percentage of
Choices in
Experiment
16.3%
22.45%
34.69%
18.37%
6.12%
2.04%

Table 3.9: Growers’ Risk Perception: Response to Scale Questions
(-4= strongly Disagree, 4= Strongly Agree)
Question Definition
Mean
1
With respect to the conduct of business I avoid 0
(2.00)a
taking risk
2
With respect to the conduct of business I prefer 1.5
(1.7)
certainty to uncertainty
0.8
3
I like “playing it safe”
(1.8)

n=49
a
Number in parentheses are standard deviations
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Table 3.10: Mixed Logit Estimations Including Growers’ Risk Perception and Risk Preferences Interaction
Model 2b
Model 3c
Model 1a
Coeff.
Std.
Coeff.
Std.
Coeff.
Std.
Error
Error
Error
Early Price
3.439
2.200 Early Price
4.049*
2.168 Early Price
2.864
2.251
Peak Price
7.247
5.540 Peak Price
6.171
5.437 Peak Price
7.757
5.600
Late Price
1.257
1.923 Late Price
1.739
1.917 Late Price
1.612
1.943
Early Volume
-0.000
0.000 Early Volume
-0.001
0.001 Early Volume
-0.000
0.000
Early Volume* RP 0.000
0.000 Early Volume* RA 0.001
0.000 Early Volume*
0.000
0.000
RARP
Peak Volume
0.000
0.000 Peak Volume
0.000
0.000 Peak Volume
0.000
0.000
Peak Volume*RP -0.000
0.000 Peak Volume*RA
-0.000
0.000 Peak
-0.000
0.000
Volume*RARP
Late Volume
0.000
0.000 Late Volume
0.000
0.000 Late Volume
0.000
0.000
Late Volume *RP 0.000
0.000 Late Volume *RA
-0.000
0.000 Late Volume
0.000
0.000
*RARP
Certification Cost -0.001*** 0.000 Certification Cost
-0.001** 0.000 Certification Cost -0.001*** 0.000
Certification
-0.000** 0.000 Certification
-0.000
0.000 Certification
-0.000
0.000
Cost*RP
Cost*RA
Cost*RARP
Penalty
-1.429*** 0.334 Penalty
-0.922*
0.581 Penalty
-1.455*** 0.346
Penalty*RP
-0.053
0.627 Penalty*RA
-0.635
0.0559 Penalty*RARP
0.039
0.601
No Contract
7.186
5.027 No Contract
6.774
4.997 No Contract
6.528
5.079
No Contract S.D.
3.138*** 0.624 No Contract S.D.
3.218*** 0.629 No Contract S.D. 3.104*** 0.620
McFadden R2d
0.14
0.139
0.148
Adj. McFadden R2 0.089
0.082
0.009
n=49
*,**,***
Indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively
a
Model 1 includes interaction terms with growers risk preference levels (RP)
b
Model 2 includes interaction terms with growers risk aversion levels (RA)
c
Model 3 includes as an interaction term a combination of risk aversion and risk preference levels (RARP)
d
McFadden R2 is given by one minus the ratio of unrestricted to restricted log likelihood values

Table 3.11: Marginal Value Estimates Under Mixed Logit Models
Marginal values associated with Risk Aversion (Model 2)
R.A. levels
Early Price
($/pound.)
Certification Cost
0.5
0.0003*
1
0.0004*
2
0.0005*
R.A. levels
Penalty
0.5
0.306
1
0.384*
2
0.541*
*
Indicates statistical significance at 10% level

Copyright © Michael Vassalos 2013
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Std.Error
0.0002
0.0002
0.0003
0.191
0.215
0.315

Chapter 4: Risk Aversion and Production Uncertainty as Parameters Influencing
Growers Marketing Choice: A Mathematical Programming Approach
4.1 Introduction
Following the pioneering work of Coase (1937), Cheung (1969) and Stiglitz
(1974) numerous empirical studies have used either mathematical programming or
econometric techniques to model growers’ choices regarding contractual agreements. The
first group of research primarily utilized whole farm economic analysis to evaluate the
selection of the optimal marketing mix (eg. Barry and Willmann, 1976; Buccola and
French, 1977; Buccola and French, 1979; Miller, 1986; Bailey and Richardson, 1985).
Studies in the second group of research used a wide variety of econometric techniques
such as: i) limited dependent variable models (Goodwin and Schroeder, 1994; Musser et
al., 1996; Katchova and Miranda, 2004; Sartwelle et al., 2000), ii) binary variable models
(Paulson et al., 2010; McLeay and Zwart, 1998) and iii) discrete choice experiments
(Hudson and Lusk, 2004). The questions that these studies answered included: i) what
factors influence the choice of contracts, ii) how much production to sell under contracts,
and iii) what tradeoffs are growers willing to make in order to participate in contractual
agreements?
Despite this abundance of research there is no general consensus of the role of
risk aversion in contract choices. The following three possibilities have been suggested in
previous research: 1) risk aversion is an important parameter in contract choice (i.e.
Ackerberg and Botticini, 2002; Parcell and Langmeir, 1997; Zheng et al., 2008), 2) to a
greater extent, it is the transaction cost or the provision of incentives that dictates the
choice of contracts (i.e. Allen and Lueck, 1999; Allen and Lueck 1995; Predergast, 1999;
Aggarwal, 2007) and 3) both transaction costs and risk aversion are significant
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determinants of contract choice (i.e. Hudson and Lusk, 2004; Fukunaga and Huffman,
209).
The objective of the present study is to investigate the role of growers’ risk
aversion in the choice of optimal marketing mix. Specifically, growers’ preferences
between two marketing options (wholesale marketing and combination of wholesale
marketing and marketing contracts) under ten risk aversion levels are examined.
The contribution of the study to the literature is threefold. Specifically, it is the
first research endeavor, to the authors’ knowledge that: i) utilizes integer programming
and biophysical simulation techniques to model contract choices, ii) discusses changes in
optimal production practices induced by the participation in a contractual agreement and
iii) compares the results of a mathematical programming formulation with findings from
discrete choice experiments. Specifically, the results of this study were compared with
the findings of Vassalos et al. (2013) who used a choice experiment to examine
wholesale tomato growers’ preferences for marketing contracts. The following sections
provide a detailed discussion regarding the hypothetical farm of the study, the marketing
options, the economic model and the production practices examined.
4.2 The Hypothetical Farm
The hypothetical vegetable farm of the study is located in Fayette County,
Kentucky (KY). Three reasons dictated the selection of this region. First, Fayette County
is among the top vegetable producing counties in the state. Second, Fayette County
includes Lexington, a regional urban center with a relative large number of restaurants.
Moreover, the increased demand for local products among wholesale buyers and
commercial buyers indicates an opportunity to exploit marketing contracts in the area as
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an alternative market option (Cable, 2011; Ernst and Woods, 2011). Third, there is an
abundance of soil and weather data for Fayette County. These data are essential
requirements for the biophysical simulation model as discussed later.
Based on the average size of operation observed in the 2010 Kentucky Produce
Planting and Marketing Intentions survey (Woods, 2010), the hypothetical farm is
assumed to have five acres of cropland available and grow tomatoes and sweet corn in a
rotation with 50% of acres in any year devoted to each crop. The choice of these
vegetables is driven by two factors. First, in terms of acres and number of farms tomatoes
and sweet corn are the top two vegetables produced in KY (2007 Census of Agriculture).
Second, growers can easily rotate among these two crops (Coolong, 2010).
The 2012 vegetable budget files of Mississippi State Budget Generator (Laughlin
and Spurlock, 2007; Ibendhal and Halich, 2010) were modified for Fayette County (KY)
conditions19 and used to estimate the selected variable costs. A detailed presentation of
these costs is reported in Table 4.1.
An important first step for the success of a commercial vegetable farm is the
selection of a marketing channel (Rowell, Woods, Mansfield, 1999). For the purposes of
the present study the following two marketing options are available: i) wholesale market
or ii) a combination of marketing contracts and wholesale marketing. Detailed discussion
for these two options is provided in the following section.

19

The required modifications were based on the 2008 vegetable budget developed by University of
Kentucky Extension Service and on personal communication with Dr. T. Coolong.
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4.3 Marketing Channels
4.3.1 Wholesale Market
Under this option, an intermediary initially buys from the grower and afterwards
sells to a retailer or the consumer. Wholesale markets have limited legal requirements for
the grower and there is no need for advertisement. On the other hand, the price offered is
lower compared to other market outlets such as farmers markets.
To represent the wholesale marketing option, price data for tomato and sweet
corn is obtained from the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). The AMS
terminal market price data set is based on vegetable sales taking place at the local
wholesale markets for 15 major cities. The prices reported are those received by
wholesalers for products that are of “good merchantable quality” (USDA, 2012). Prices
from the Atlanta terminal market in proximity to Kentucky markets are used in this study.
Specifically, the data set utilized includes 13 years (1998-2010) of weekly price
data for yellow sweet corn and for three different sizes (medium, large, extra-large) of
mature green tomatoes. The Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter is used to remove the
observed yearly trend of the price data. Following Ravn and Uhling (2002) a smoothing
parameter (λ) of 6.25 is used. Finally, the prices were transformed to $/pound and
$/dozen ears for tomatoes and sweet corn respectively.
4.3.2 Contract Design
The second marketing option available for the hypothetical grower represents a
combination of marketing contracts for large tomatoes20 and wholesale marketing. A
marketing contract is defined as an oral or written agreement between a grower and a

20

Only large tomatoes are examined in order to better imitate the conjoint experiment in Vassalos et al.
(2013)
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buyer (wholesaler, restaurant, grocery store, etc.) who sets some quantity/quality
requirements, a price for the product coupled with possible price adjustments, and
delivery period requirement (McDonald et al., 2004; Katchova and Miranda, 2004).
Marketing contract agreements can act as a tool to coordinate the market, achieve a
constant supply of local vegetables, and possibly improve the economic outcome of
producers.
Three mutually exclusive marketing contracts (contract 1, contract 2, and contract
3) are defined for this study utilizing different levels of the following eight attributes:
early period price, peak period price, late period price, early period volume requirements,
peak period volume requirements, late period volume requirements, penalty and
certification cost. Early period, refers approximately to the period up to July 10, the peak
period covers July and August, and the late period includes September and October.
Selection of these time periods is based on focus group discussions with buyers.
Definitions for each attribute are reported in Table 4.2.
The present study employs a price per pound mechanism contingent on the quality
of the product and the delivery period. The USDA-AMS tomato prices from Atlanta
Terminal Market are used as base prices and are modified accordingly following
comments from focus groups. Specifically, following the feedback from the focus group,
the examined contracts offer the highest price range levels for late period production
($0.70 to $0.84 per pound) followed by early period production ($0.62 to $0.74 per
pound) and peak period production ($0.53 to $0.58 per pound) . For comparison
purposes, the average AMS prices for large tomatoes are $0.67, $0.57, $0.53 for the late,
early and peak period respectively.
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Regarding volume requirements, the scarcity of detailed yield data leads to the
use of biophysical simulation techniques. Since growers do not generally contract all of
their production (Katchova and Miranda, 2004), the volume requirements specified on
the contract profiles correspond to 10%, 15% and 20% of the average yield calculated by
DSSAT, evenly distributed among the three periods (early, peak and late).
If the grower fails to satisfy the requirements of the contract then a penalty clause
is activated. The literature examines several possible penalty structures (Wolf et al.,
2001; Hueth et al., 1999). For the purposes of the present study, the penalties are defined
as a percentage of the full contract price. Specifically, three penalty levels are used in the
study: 5%, 10% and 15% of the price. In line with the price determination, the final
selection of penalty levels is made following the feedback from the focus groups.
The certification cost attribute refers to lump sum payments that growers have to
provide for third party audits conducting quality control. The importance of such costs in
the choice of contractual agreements has been mentioned earlier. Based on feedback from
the focus groups three levels of certification cost were used: $0 (no certification cost),
$500 and $1000. Finally, the volume requirements of the three contracts correspond to
10%, 15% and 20% of the average yields estimated through the biophysical simulation
model (discussed in the next section) for each of the three periods (early, peak and late).
Contract 1 consists of a combination of the minimum values of each attribute.
Contract 2 includes a combination of the medium levels of each one of the eight
attributes. Finally, contract 3 incorporates a combination of the highest price, highest
volume requirements, highest penalty levels and highest certification cost (Table 4.2).
The selection of these combinations for the examined contracts is made in order to avoid
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the existence of a clearly superior contract (i.e. high price, low penalties, zero
certification cost).
4.4 Economic Model
The economic environment of the hypothetical wholesale vegetable farm is
modeled with a combination of quadratic and integer programming formulation
embodied in a mean-variance framework (E-V). Two reasons justify the use of integer
programming (IP). First, the contractual agreements offered in the study are mutually
exclusive and non-negotiable. This is required in order to imitate the discrete choice
experiment environment. IP enables an efficient modeling of such constraints. Second, IP
is a powerful and efficient tool when multiple choice sets are considered simultaneously
(Danok et al., 1980).
The objective of the model is the maximization of net returns above selected
variable costs less the risk aversion coefficient multiplied by the variance of net returns.
The risk aversion coefficients are estimated using the McCarl and Bessler (1989)
approach. This technique assumes that a grower maximizes the lower limit from a
confidence interval of normally distributed net returns. Based on this approach, nine
levels of risk aversion are estimated. Each one of these levels corresponds to a 5%
increment from the previous one starting from 50% (risk neutral) up to 95% (extreme risk
aversion).
Regarding the model formulation, the present essay expanded the model
introduced in the second chapter of the dissertation to include the following additions:
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where SATISFYYR, FAILCONTR,WK,YR, PICKCONTR are binary variables and M is a
number larger than the highest number of pounds that can be sold under contract (Danok
et al., 1980). SHORTAGECONTR,WK,YR is a continuous variable defined as the difference
between the contract volume requirements for the different weeks and the large tomato
pounds actually produced during those weeks for each of the production years examined.
The first constraint (equation (4.1)) insures that only one, if any, contract will be
selected. This approach enables the simulation of the choice experiment described by
Vassalos et al. (2013)21, which is one of the objectives of the present study.
If a contract option is selected then the grower will either 1) satisfy the weekly
(WK) volume requirements specified by the examined contracts each production year
(YR) or 2) fail to satisfy the volume requirements. Under the former option the grower
will sell the required amount of tomatoes (CONTSALES) at the original contract price.

21

Under the choice experiment, the growers were asked to select one and only one option from three
choices: two distinct marketing contract formulations and the option of “I will not choose any of the
offered contracts”.
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Under the latter case the grower will sell the amount of tomatoes produced (PENSALES)
under a reduced penalty price.
The aforementioned options are formulated with the use of either/or constraints
(Equations (4.2) and (4.3)) and with the use of Boolean logical conditions specified in the
model (Equations (4.4) and (4.5)). For instance, if FAILCONTR,WK,YR = 0 then the
constraint (4.3) holds and the grower will be able to meet the contract requirements.
Marketing contracts frequently include disclaimers that allow the buyer to
terminate the contractual agreement if the grower repeatedly fails to meet the agreed
terms. Equation (4.6) models such a disclaimer. Specifically, it establishes that the
contract agreement will be terminated if the grower fails to meet the requirements more
than two weeks during that year. Lastly, equation (4.7) establishes the balance
requirement for the contract volume. The complete mathematical formulation is
presented at appendix B.
In order to estimate whether a given period is suitable for fieldwork, the approach
used in Shockley et al. (2011) is employed. Specifically, the probability of not raining
more than 0.15 inches per day is calculated based on weather data from 1971 to 2008.
This probability was multiplied with the days worked in a week and the hours worked in
a day to determine expected suitable field hours per week. Daily weather data for the 38
year period are obtained from the University of Kentucky Agricultural Weather Center.
The model is estimated under two scenarios. In the first one, the grower is able to
select some combination among two marketing channels: 1) wholesale marketing only
and 2) wholesale marketing and contractual agreements (for large tomatoes). Under the
second scenario, sensitivity analyses tests were conducted to examine the effect of price

76

alterations on the choice of marketing outlet. This approach will help to identify changes
in economic performance production practices resulting from the participation in
marketing contracts.
4.5 Production Environment and Biophysical Simulation Model
Statistical regression equations and simulation models are the two main
techniques used in the literature to overcome yield data limitations (Walker, 1989). The
present study employs a special case of simulation modeling known as biophysical
simulation (Musser and Tew, 1984). Specifically, yield data for tomatoes and sweet corn
are estimated using the Decision Support System for Agrotechnology Transfer (DSSAT
v. 4.0) a biophysical simulation model (Hoogenboom et al., 2003; Jones et al., 2003). The
selection of DSSAT is based on the following three reasons: i) it is well documented, ii)
it has been validated in numerous studies over the last 15 years and iii) it incorporates
modules for tomatoes and sweet corn.
The minimum data requirements to generate yield estimates using DSSAT
include: i) soil data, ii) daily weather data and iii) production practices information for
the region and crops under consideration. These data sets are obtained from the National
Cooperative Soil Survey of NRCS, the University of Kentucky Agricultural Weather
Center and the University of Kentucky Extension Service Bulletins (Coolong et al., 2010)
respectively.
Based on the soil maps the most common soil type in Fayette County (KY) is silt
loams with 65% of the soil classified as deep silt loams and 35% as shallow. This
distinction is based on the percent slopes from the soil maps. Specifically, following
Shockley (2010), soils with slopes less than 6% are characterized as shallow and soils
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with slopes between 6% and 20% as deep. In order to better simulate the soil conditions
of the examined region, the default soil types of DSSAT were modified. The parameters
altered include soil color, runoff potential, drainage and soil slope. The exact soil
specifications are reported at Table 4.3.
The weather data set used in the study includes daily climate information
(minimum/maximum temperature, precipitation) for 38 years (1971-2008). The data set
was finalized with the estimation of solar radiation from the DSSAT v. 4.0 weather
module.
The production practices data set contains information for transplanting period
(tomatoes), planting period (sweet corn), harvesting period, irrigation requirements, plant
population, planting depth, fertilization requirements and cultivar types. In the examined
region, tomato transplant extends from early May (spring crop) through early August (fall
crop) and sweet corn is planted from April 20 to July 20. Tomatoes are typically
harvested 65 to 80 days after transplant and sweet corn is usually harvested 70 to 95 days
after planting.
4.5.1 Yield Estimates and Validation
Yield estimation for all the possible combinations of transplanting/planting and
harvesting periods requires coding of more than 9500 treatments22 in DSSAT which is
beyond the scope and objectives of the present essay. In order to reduce the number of
treatments, the examined production practices include eight bi-weekly transplanting days
for tomatoes (starting May 1), nine weekly planting days for sweet corn (starting April

22

((120 transplanting days* 15 harvesting days for tomatoes)+(120 planting days *25 harvesting days for
sweet corn)*2 for the 2 soil types
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25) and four weekly harvest periods for each crop. One cultivar is examined for each crop
since only one is available in DSSAT v 4.0.
One of the most important aspects in biophysical simulation modeling is the
validation of the estimated yields. Considering the lack of yield data in the examined
region (Fayette County, KY) the following two non-statistical validation methods are
employed: i) expert’s opinion and ii) comparison with findings from previous studies.
Specifically, for the former approach, the initial yield estimations were presented
to Dr. Timothy Coolong23 and he was asked whether or not they were a reasonable
representation of yields in Central Kentucky for tomatoes and sweet corn. Following Dr.
Coolong’s recommendations, three harvesting periods for tomatoes (63, 70, 77 days) and
one for sweet corn (84 days) are kept in the final model formulations. The simulated
yields were considered as higher than what an average vegetable grower can achieve but
not unreasonable for the best producers. Yields estimated for harvesting periods 84 days
after transplanting for tomatoes and 70, 77 and 91 days after planting for sweet corn are
removed from the yield data set since they were considered as not achievable in the
examined area. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 provide detailed information regarding the production
practices examined and summary statistics for the simulated yields respectively.
For the latter approach trends observed in previous research were compared with
trends in the simulated yield data set. As such, in line with Hossain et al. (2004),
Huevelink (1999) and Schweers and Grimes (1976), the simulated tomato yields had
approximately a bell shaped form and are substantially influenced by the transplanting
period (Figure 4.1). Regarding sweet corn, consistent with Williams (2008) and Williams
and Linquist (2007) planting period plays an important role in production (Figure 4.2).
23

Extension Vegetable Specialist, Assistant Extension Professor, University of Kentucky
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Since the weather conditions and soil data in Fayette County (KY) are different
from the ones in the previously mentioned studies, absolute yield values are not
compared. However, in order to provide further validation, the simulated yields for
tomatoes and sweet corn are compared with experimental trials that conducted in Central
and Eastern Kentucky. For tomatoes, the simulated yields compare favorably to the
highest yielding cultivars in the experimental trials (Rowell et al., 2004; Rowell et al.,
2005; Rowell et al., 2006; Coolong et al., 2009). Regarding sweet corn, the average
simulated yields are slightly lower than the best yellow cultivar of the experimental trials
((Jones and Sears, 2005).
4.6 Results
The findings of the mathematical programming formulation indicate that
wholesale marketing is preferred, over a combination of wholesale marketing and
marketing contracts, for all risk aversion levels (Table 4.6). This result are in line with
Vassalos et al. (2013) who illustrated that, on average, wholesale growers do not suffer
utility loss if a contract option is not available to them. The primary reason for not
selecting a mix of wholesale marketing and contracts lies in the yield losses associated
with the earlier production, required by a marketing contract agreement (Figure 4.1). In
agreement with the underlying theory, as risk aversion levels increase growers’ trade off
expected net returns for lower variance. For instance, the net returns for an extremely risk
averse grower (level 9) correspond to 80% of the maximum possible net returns coupled
with a reduction in coefficient of variation (C.V.) from 24.52% to 16.18% (Table 6).
Compared to other agronomic crops, fresh vegetables have fewer storage
opportunities and therefore an inelastic supply at a given time period. Consequently, in
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order to satisfy the requirements of the selected market outlet and achieve the optimal
economic outcome growers have to carefully plan their planting and harvesting activities.
Table 4.7 reports the optimal production schedule and land allocation for four of
the examined risk aversion levels. The findings indicate that the optimal schedule for a
risk neutral grower, seeking to maximize net returns, includes a combination of late
transplanting/harvesting period for tomatoes and late planting for sweet corn.
Specifically, July 10 and July 24 are selected as optimal transplanting periods for
tomatoes and June 21 as optimal planting for sweet corn. Regarding tomato harvesting,
77 days after transplant is the time selected as optimal (Table 4.7). All the available five
acres are utilized.
The following three alterations are adopted as risk aversion levels increase: 1)
gradually shift focus towards earlier transplanting periods for tomatoes (June 12 instead
of July 10), 2) earlier planting for sweet corn (from June 21 to May 23) and 3) expand the
number of optimal transplanting periods from two to three for the highest risk aversion
level level (Table 4.7). These strategies help to reduce the variation in net returns, which
is an objective for risk averse growers. The reduction in C.V. results from a reduced price
variation. Specifically, the price coefficient of variation drops from 19% (July 24, 77
days harvest) to 10% (June 12, 77 days harvest). Similarly to the risk neutral case, all five
acres are utilized.
The results from Vassalos et al. (2013) indicated that growers are more likely to
participate in a marketing contract agreement if the early price offered is higher.
Consequently, an intriguing research question is to examine the impact of higher contract
prices, ceteris paribus, on the choice of optimal marketing outlet in the mathematical
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programing framework. In order to answer this question sensitivity analyses were
conducted. Specifically, for the risk neutral case, the following four scenarios are
examined: i) increase only in the early period price, ii) increase only in the peak period
price, iii) increase only in the late period price and iv) increase all prices simultaneously.
The findings indicate that the combination of wholesale and marketing contracts is
preferred, for the first time, when all three prices increase simultaneously by 70%. The
contract selected as optimal under this scenario is contract 3.
If the model formulation “enforces” participation in a marketing contract
agreement, by increasing the contract prices, then the optimal production practices are
significantly altered compared to those under only wholesale marketing. Specifically, two
major changes occur under this scenario for a risk neutral grower: 1) Harvesting 70 and
77 days after transplanting is preferred, instead of after 77 days only and 2) transplanting
occurs all eight of the examined weeks between May 1 and August 7 (Table 4.8).
However, transplanting at July 10 and harvesting 77 days later is still the period with the
greater number of acres with tomatoes. No alteration is realized for sweet corn production
practices (Table 4.8). The aforementioned changes are required in order to satisfy the
volume requirements of the contract and receive the higher prices.
4.7 Conclusions
The present study employed a whole farm modeling approach to investigate
optimal marketing strategies for fresh vegetable growers, under different risk aversion
levels. Specifically, a combination of integer and quadratic programming are used to
model the economic environment of a vegetable farm located at Fayette County,

82

Kentucky. Two marketing options, wholesale marketing only and a combination of
wholesale marketing with marketing contracts, are examined.
The former approach is characterized by greater volatility in prices, but provides
increased freedom to the grower regarding the choice of production practices. The latter
option provides higher and more stable prices but requires constant production
throughout the year, additional cost in the form of third party audits and reduced yield
compared to wholesale marketing only.
The findings of the study indicated that wholesale marketing is preferred over a
combination of wholesales and marketing contracts. Risk aversion levels influenced the
selection of optimal production practices but not the choice of marketing outlet.
Furthermore, findings from a sensitivity analysis illustrated that when all three contract
prices (early, peak, late) are increased simultaneously, from the base price scenario, a risk
neutral grower will prefer the combination of wholesale marketing and contracts over
only wholesale marketing.
When the grower selects a combination of wholesale marketing and contractual
agreements as a market outlet two main changes in production practices are noticed
compared to wholesale marketing only. First, transplanting dates cover the whole period
allowed. Second, harvesting occurs during multiple time periods.
The findings of the study may act as a guide for the growers. In particular, the
results highlight the importance of a carefully scheduled production plan in order to
achieve the best possible economic outcome for commercial fresh vegetable production.
Limitations of this study are related with the use of biophysical simulation
modeling to overcome yield data limitations. Specifically, DSSAT v 4.0 includes only
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one variety for tomatoes and sweet corn that are not commonly used in Kentucky.
Finally, future work may investigate how the results change if i) the model is utilized in
areas where marketing contracts are a more common practice, or, ii) with the inclusion of
a farmers’ market option if the required price data are available.
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Figure 4.1: Simulated Tomato Yields24
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Source: Biophysical simulation results
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The graph depicts average tomato yields across years and soil types
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Figure 4.2: Sweet Corn Yields25
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Source: Biophysical Simulation Results

25

The graph depicts average sweet corn yields across years and soil types. Harvesting period is 84 days
after planting.
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Table 4.1: Production Costs per Acre
Tomato Expenses
Type of Expense
Fertilizer
Herbicide
Insecticide
Seed & planting supplies
Labor
Machinery expenses
Other expenses (i.e. boxes)
Interest on capital
Irrigation supplies

Cost ($)
319.67
2.33
97.47
1575.08
3688.26
139.69
1600.00
76.00
627.00

Sweet Corn Expenses
Type of Expense
Cost($)
Fertilizer
194.16
Herbicide
21.16
Insecticide
208.10
Seed & planting supplies
126.00
Labor
116.58
Machinery expenses
66.76
Other expenses (i.e. crates) 580.00
Interest on capital
10.58
Irrigation supplies
410.00
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Table 4.2: Contract Attributes and their Levels
Variable
Description
Early Price
Peak Price
Late Price
Early Volume
Peak Volume
Late Volume
Penalties
Certification
Cost

Price offered for late JuneEarly July ($/lb)
Price offered for
July-August ($/lb)
Price offered for
September – October ($/lb)
Volume requirements for
Late June- Early July
(lbs./week)
Volume requirements for
July- August (lbs./week)
Volume requirements for
September- October
(lbs./week)
Price reduction if the
contract agreements are not
satisfied (% of price)
3rd party audit cost ($)
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Levels
1
2
0.62
0.68

3
0.74

0.53

0.55

0.58

0.70

0.77

0.84

323

353

382

753

809

882

632

691

735

5%

10%

15%

0

500

1000

Table 4.3: Soil Characteristics
Soil
Color Drainage

Runoff
Potential
Brown Moderately Lowest
Well

Deep Silty
Loam
(65%)
Shallow
Brown Somewhat
Silty Loam
Poor
(35%)
Source: Shockley, 2010

Slope Runoff
(%)
Curve #
3
64

Moderately 9
Low

89

80

Albedo Drainage
rate
0.12
0.4
0.12

0.2

Table 4.4: Summary of Production Practices Used in the Biophysical Simulation Model
1) Tomato Production Practices
Transplanting date
May 1, May 15, May 29, June 12, June 26,
July 10, July 24, August 7
Harvesting period
63, 70, 77 days after transplant
Cultivar
BHN 66
Actual N/week (lbs/acre)
10
Irrigation
Drip irrigation, 1 inch water/week
Plant population (plants/acre)
5,000
Transplant age
42 days
Planting depth
2.5 inches
Assumptions
Dry Matter = 6%, Cull ratio = 20%
2) Sweet Corn Production Practices
Planting date
April 25, May 2, May 9, May 16, May 23,
May 30, June 7, June 14, June 28
Harvesting period
84 days after planting
Cultivar
Sweet corn cultivar of DSSAT v. 4
Actual N/week
2 applications of Ammonium Nitrate. One
pre-plant ( 90 lb. actual N/acre) and a
second 4 weeks after planting (50 lb. actual
N/acre)
Irrigation
Drip irrigation, 1 inch water/week
Plant population (plants/acre)
20,000
Planting depth
2 inches
Assumptions
Dry matter =24%, Cull ratio= 3%, Ear
weight = 0.661 pounds

90

Table 4.5: Summary Statistics26
Tomato Yields by Size (simulated)
Medium Large
Extra Large
Average (pounds/acre)
6,580
26,321
10,967
Standard Deviation
1,976.92 7,907.67 3,294.86
Coefficient of Variation
30.00
30.00
30.00
Maximum Yield
10,425
41,700
17,375
Minimum Yield
0
0
0
Tomato Prices
Medium Large
Extra Large
Average ($/25 pound boxes)
$15.04
$15.56
$16.31
Standard Deviation
3.12
3.48
3.84
Coefficient of Variation
20.00
22.00
23.00
Maximum Price ($/25 pound
29.55
30.58
30.70
box)
Minimum Price ($/25 pound box) 8.99
9.77
9.68
Sweet Corn Yield (simulated, one size)
Average (ears/acre)
12,687
Standard Deviation
6,140
Coefficient of Variation
47.00
Maximum Yield
28,579
Minimum Yield
903
Sweet Corn Price
Average ($/crate)
$13.04
Standard Deviation
3.94
Coefficient of Variation
30.00
Maximum Price($/crate)
33.78
Minimum Price($/crate)
6.56
Source: DSSAT model yield results, Atlanta Agricultural Market Station prices

26

The maximum and minimum yields reported on the table refer to different production practices, thus
one is not expected to add the maximum yield of medium, large and extra‐large to obtain maximum yield
per acre
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Table 4.6: Net Returns Above Variable Costs
Mean Net % of Max. Standard Coefficient of
Risk Levelsa Optimal
Market Outlet returns
net returns Deviation Variation (%)
Risk neutral Wholesale
85,382
100 %
20939
24.52
1 (z= 55%)
Wholesale
85,288
99.8 %
20747
24.33
2 (z= 60%)
Wholesale
83,779
98.0 %
18452
22.02
3 (z= 65%)
Wholesale
82,301
96.2 %
16914
20.55
4 (z= 70%)
Wholesale
80,066
93.3 %
15363
19.19
5 (z= 75%)
Wholesale
78,001
90.5 %
14120
18.10
6 (z= 80%)
Wholesale
76,581
88.5 %
13399
17.50
7 (z= 85%)
Wholesale
75,200
86.4 %
12816
17.04
8 (z= 90%)
Wholesale
73,231
83.4 %
12098
16.52
9 (z= 95%)
Wholesale
71,591
80.7 %
11581
16.18
a
Following McCarl and Bessler (1989), under the assumption of normal distribution,
the risk levels are given by: r(X)= 2za/σy
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Table 4.7: Summary of Optimal Production Practices by Risk Attitude
Sweet Corn
Tomatoes27
Risk
Transplanting Acres (% of total)
Planting Acres (% of total)
Levels
Date
Day
DSL
SSL
DSL
SSL
Risk Neutral July 10
27.0%
14.7%
June 21 32.5%
17.5%
July 24
5.2%
2.8%
3 (z=65%)
June 12
5.4%
3.0%
May 23 32.5%
17.5%
July 10
27.0%
14.6%
5 (z= 75%)
June 12
16.6%
9.0%
May 23 32.5%
17.5%
July 10
16.0%
8.6%
7 (z=85%)
June 12
23.0%
12.4%
May 23 32.5%
17.5%
July 10
8.4%
4.4%
July 24
1.2%
0.6%

27

Optimal harvesting period for tomatoes, for all the risk aversion levels and for both models, is 77 days
after transplanting.
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Table 4.8: Production Practices Under Contract (Risk Neutral Only)
Tomatoes
Sweet Corn
Transplanting Harvesting Acres (% of total)
Planting
Acres (% of total)
Date
Period
DSL
SSL
Day
DSL SSL
May 1
70
0.32
0.18
June 21
32.5% 17.5%
May 15
70
0.52
0.28
May 29
70
0.48
0.26
June 12
70
0.44
0.24
June 26
70
0.42
0.22
July 10
70
0.38
0.20
July 24
70
0.40
0.22
August 7
70
0.68
0.36
May 1
77
0.24
0.12
May 15
77
0.42
0.22
May 29
77
0.38
0.20
June 12
77
0.38
0.20
June 26
77
0.36
0.20
July 10
77
26.74
14.4
July 24
77
0.36
0.18
August 7
77

Copyright © Michael Vassalos 2013
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Future Work
The present dissertation combined mathematical programming and discrete choice
experiment techniques in a three essays format to investigate: 1) fresh vegetable growers’
choice of optimal production practices and market outlet under different risk aversion
levels, ii) the impact of season price versus annual price trend consideration on the
optimal choice and iii) growers’ preferences for marketing contracts.
Four main data sets are used to achieve the research objectives. First, biophysical
simulation modeling is employed to overcome yield data limitations. This approach
facilitated the development of an extensive data set, for tomatoes and sweet corn, that
includes yield information for different production practices, soil and weather conditions.
Second, primary data are used to evaluate growers’ preferences for marketing contracts.
Third, the required price data for the analysis are obtained from the USDA agricultural
market stations (Atlanta). Lastly, production practice data (for example tomato
transplanting periods, sweet corn planting periods, and fertilizer requirements) are
obtained from University of Kentucky Extension Service production guideline bulletins.
The contribution of this dissertation to the literature is threefold. Specifically, it is
the first research endeavor that: i) examines the interaction among production practices,
market timing and risk aversion for vegetable production, ii) investigates growers’
preferences for marketing contracts as well as the effect of risk perception on the contract
choices and iii) employs biophysical simulation for an economic study on vegetables.
The second chapter of the dissertation investigates the role of risk aversion and
price distribution knowledge on the choice of optimal production practices for a
hypothetical wholesale vegetable grower in Fayette County, Kentucky. Two scenarios are
examined: 1) the grower considers seasonal price trends and 2) the grower considers only
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annual price trends. Quadratic programming formulation, embodied in a mean-variance
framework, is used to model the economic environment of the hypothetical farm. This
approach enabled consideration of competition among resources for the two crops
(tomatoes and sweet corn) and permited the examination of ten different risk aversion
levels.
The findings indicate that a risk neutral grower, aiming to maximize net returns,
should primarily focus on late production both for sweet corn and tomatoes (June 21 and
July 10 respectively). As the risk aversion level increases a couple of alterations in
production practices are highlighted to reduce growers’ risk exposure. First, growers’
should shift focus to earlier planting/transplanting periods, and thus earlier marketing
periods. Second, for high risk averse growers, the number of optimal transplanting
periods is increased (from two to three). Moreover, in line with the initial expectations,
the findings indicate that if the grower knows considers seasonal price variation then
he/she can substantially improve the expected net returns and better manage risk.
Besides modifying production practices, growers can mitigate risk with
participation in marketing outlets that offer more stable prices throughout the season
compared to a wholesale only option. An example of such an outlet is the use of
marketing contract agreements. Despite the very rich literature regarding factors affecting
participation in contracts (i.e., age, education, etc.) the research regarding growers’
preferences for marketing or productions contracts is rather limited.
The third chapter of the dissertation is an effort to fill this gap. Specifically, with
the use of a discrete choice experiment, the manuscript identifies fresh vegetable
growers’ preferences for eight marketing contract attributes and the role of risk
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perception as well as the role of risk preferences in the choice of contracts. The attributes
examined are early period price, late period price, peak period price, early period volume
requirements, peak period volume requirements, late period volume requirements,
penalty and certification cost.
The main data set used in the manuscript is obtained from a mail survey
administrated to 315 wholesale tomato growers in Kentucky, Illinois, Ohio and Indiana.
Conditional logit and mixed logit models are used to analyze preferences. Both models
indicate that growers prefer contracts with higher early price offered coupled with lower
penalties and certification cost. The mixed logit formulation revealed that, on average,
growers do not suffer from utility loss if they do not have a contract choice offered.
However, the results also indicate heterogeneity in preferences among growers. Lastly,
the findings indicate that risk aversion and risk preferences have a minimal impact on the
choice of contract agreements.
Chapter four combines the previous two chapters. Specifically, the model
formulation of chapter two is extended, with the use of integer programing, in order to
enable the inclusion of a combination of wholesale marketing and marketing contracts as
an alternative to wholesale only. Three marketing contracts and ten risk aversion levels
are examined. The findings indicate that, irrespectively of risk aversion, wholesale
marketing is preferred over the combination of wholesale marketing and marketing
contracts. Although risk aversion levels do not influence the choice of marketing outlet,
the findings indicate that they affect the choice of optimal production practices. This
finding is in line with the results of the second chapter. Furthermore, sensitivity analyses
findings illustrated that a combination of wholesale marketing and marketing contracts is
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preferred when the prices for all periods (early, peak, and late) are increased. This finding
differs from the results in chapter 3 indicating that growers prefer contracts with higher
early price.
In summary, the findings of the dissertation provide valuable insights both to
growers and to buyers. More precisely, the results identified critical aspects that can help
mitigate the risk associated with fresh vegetable production and achieve the optimal
economic outcome. For instance, consideration of seasonal price information and
appropriate selection of production timing, based on the risk levels of the grower, are two
of these factors. Furthermore, the information regarding growers’ preferences for
marketing contracts can be utilized by buyers in order to create contracts that can attract
greater participation of growers.
As far as future research endeavors are concerned, a number of possibilities exist.
First, if the required price data sets are available, inclusion of additional marketing
options (i.e. farmers’ market, CSA marketing, etc.) can be incorporated in the model to
examine how growers’ optimal marketing decisions are modified. Furthermore, the
findings of the study can be compared with either choice experiments or mathematical
programming formulations examining preferences for locations where marketing
contracts are more commonly used and fresh vegetable farming is more popular. Lastly,
an intriguing topic may be the inclusion of more than two crops in the examined model
formulations.
Last but not least, without doubt there will be errors, omissions and oversimplifications for which I take absolute responsibility, while hoping that the rest of the
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material will be enough to stimulate new trains of thought into the economics of fresh
vegetable production and marketing.

Copyright © Michael Vassalos 2013
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Survey Questionnaire
University Of Kentucky
Tomato Marketing Study

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research. In this survey, we are interested in
your opinions and choices of possible marketing contracts for fresh tomatoes. You will
need about 15-20 minutes to complete the survey. We appreciate your time.
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We would like to start the survey by learning about the characteristics of your farm. The
person who answers the survey should be the one that is primarily involved in the
management of the farm.
A1. Where is your farm business located?

State: ____________
County: _________
Zip Code: _______

A2. What is your total farm size?
0.1 to 0.9 acres
1 to 4.9 acres
5 to 14.9 acres
15 to 24.9 acres
25 to 49.9 acres
50 to 99.9 acres
More than 100 acres
A3. How many acres are dedicated to field grown production?
0.1 to 0.9 acres
1 to 4.9 acres
5 to 14.9 acres
15 to 24.9 acres
25 to 49.9 acres
50 to 99.9 acres
More than 100 acres
A4. Are you involved with any greenhouse or protected tomato production?
No

Yes

A5. Are you in a position to expand your operation to grow more tomatoes if the right
opportunity came along?
No

Yes

A6. Over the last three years, your tomato production has:
Decreased

Stayed the
same

Increased
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A7.Do you have experience growing grain crops?
No

Yes

A8. What marketing channel(s) are you using for your vegetable crops (check all that
apply)?
Direct marketing (i.e. farmer’s market, on farm sales, CSA’s, u-pick etc.)
Local Wholesalers (i.e. local grocers, DSDs or restaurants)
Regional Wholesalers (i.e. chain store distribution centers, terminal markets,
brokers etc.)
Marketing Cooperatives
Produce Auctions
Other ______________________
A9. For the field grown tomatoes on your farm, please provide the following information
Acres with field grown tomatoes: ______________acres
Average yield (lbs. /acre or # of 25 pound boxes) the last 3 years:
_________________(units)
Typical transplanting periods (dd/mm): _____________________
_____________________
_____________________
______________________
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Now, we would like to know a bit more about your perception and your experience with
marketing contracts.
Marketing contracts, in the context of this survey, refer to a written agreement
between a producer and a buyer that sets a price and possible price adjustments (i.e.
penalties for bad quality) as well as an outlet for the vegetables produced before harvest
or before the commodity is ready to be marketed. The grower assumes all risk related to
amount produced, but shares risk related to market price with the buyer.
B1. Have you ever participated in a marketing contract agreement for any kind of
agricultural product?
No

Yes

B2. Would you be interested in participating in produce marketing contract agreements?
No
Maybe, depending on the
Yes
terms
B3. Please, rank the top four reasons that would encourage you to use a marketing
contract (1= the least important and 4 = the most important reason)
____ Reduce price risk
____Opportunity to sell higher volume
____ Secure income
____ Prior experience with contracts
____ No need to worry about supply
____ Lower distribution cost
channels
____ Access new market opportunities
____ Maintenance of future relationship
with buyers
____ Bonuses for better quality
____ Other (Specify):
_____________________
B4. Please, rank the top four reasons that would discourage you from using marketing
contracts for your vegetable production (1= the least important and 4= the most important
reason)
____ Difficult to satisfy quality
requirements
____ Unhappy with the price terms
____ Severe penalties
____ Inflexibility to pursue other markets
____ Cost of enforcement
____ “Bad” previous experience
____ Other: (Specify)_________

____ Unhappy with the quality terms
____ Delivery time
____ Method of payment
____ Not enough information about
contracts
____ Difficult to satisfy volume
requirements
____ Not enough land
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C1. With the following questions we would like to learn a bit more about your risk
comfort levels.
Please consider the choice you would make in the following hypothetical situation:
You will be given 150 tomato plants (in 5 bundles of 30 plants each) for free, to use in
the coming season. There are two types of plants, A and B, and you can choose any
combination of the two that totals 5 bundles.
The A and B plants have different levels of resistance to tomato diseases. The A plants
have potentially higher harvests but are more vulnerable to disease. If disease does not
occur, the A plants will produce a harvest worth $30 per bundle. However if disease
occurs (50% of the time), the A plants’ harvest is worthless ($0 per bundle). The B plants
are disease-resistant and always produce a harvest worth $10 per bundle.
The following table illustrates the different combinations of type A and B plants that you
could receive, and the value of their combined harvests based on the weather. Please
check one box to indicate which combination of plants you would choose.
I choose (check
one of the six
combinations
A-F below)

Bundles of 30
type A plants

Bundles of 30
type B plants

If disease does
not occur (50%)

If disease
occurs (50%)

o

A

0

5

$50

$50

o

B

1

4

$70

$40

o

C

2

3

$90

$30

o

D

3

2

$110

$20

o

E

4

1

$130

$10

o

F

5

0

$150

$0

C2. With respect to the conduct of business, I avoid taking risk (select one):
I strongly disagree
o -4

I Strongly Agree
o -3

o -2

o -1

o 0 o 1

o 2

o 3

o 4

C3. With respect to the conduct of business, I prefer certainty to uncertainty (select one):
I strongly disagree
I Strongly Agree
o -4

o -3

o -2

o -1

o 0
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o 1

o 2 o 3

o 4

C4. I like “playing it safe” (select one):
I strongly disagree
o -4

o -3

o -2

o -1

I Strongly Agree
o 0
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o 1

o 2 o 3

o 4

Suppose you have the opportunity to enter a marketing contract agreement for fresh
tomatoes. In the following choice situations you will be presented with a series of options
for marketing contracts. Each choice situation contains three options described by their
characteristics. Please select the option that is better for you. Please, bear in mind that:





Please choose ONLY ONE OPTION in each situation
Marketing contracts A and B given in each situation are identical in all other
features not specifically listed
Assume that the options in EACH situation are the ONLY ones available
Do NOT compare options in different situations

In the following six choice situations you will be considering marketing contracts for
Large Tomatoes US #1. Average Prices from Agricultural Market Service (Atlanta
Terminal Market) for the period 1998-2010 were: $ 0.54/lb for June, $0.53 for JulyAugust and $0.64 for September- October.
Delivery Period: 1) early refers to late June early July (approximately 3 weeks up until
4th of July), peak period refers to July and August (approximately 8 week period) and, 3)
late refers to September and October (approximately 8 week period).
Penalties refer to price reduction in case that the producer fails to deliver the agreed
volume and quality. The terminate contract option means that the contract is no longer
valid and the producer has to sell the production in the spot market
Options A and B correspond to two different possibilities of marketing contract
arrangements. Under the no contract option the producer will receive market price.
Certification Cost refers to a dollar amount that the producer has to pay to a third agency
that will verify the quality of production (3rd party audit).
Once again, suppose you are making these choices in real life. Please, try to select the
options that would be closest to what you would do in real life.
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SITUATION 128
Contract A
Delivery Price /
Period
Pound
Early
Peak

$ 0.62
$ 0.55

Volume
Penalty
(pounds/ acre/
week)
2,200/acre/week Terminate29
5,500/acre/week Terminate

Late

$ 0.70

5,100/acre/week Terminate
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Please choose only
option:

28

Contract A

Contract B

No
Contract

Certification Price / Volume
Penalty Certification
Cost
Pound (pounds/ acre/
Cost
week)
I will
not
$0
$ 0.74 2,600/acre/week 5%
$1000
Choose
$0.53 6,000/acre/week 5%
$0
$1000
either A
or B
$0.77 4,300/acre/week 5%
$0
$1000
Contract B

No Contract

one

Penalties refer to a price reduction if the producer fails to deliver the required quantity/ quality of tomatoes
Terminate contract means that the contract will no longer be valid if the grower fails to deliver the required quality/quantity of tomatoes. Thus,
production will be sold in the spot market
29

SITUATION 2
Contract A
Delivery Price /
Period
Pound

Contract B

Volume
Penalty
(pounds/ acre/ week)

No
Contract

Early

$ 0.62

2,400/acre/week

Certification Price
Cost
/
Pound
Terminate $1000
$0.74

Peak

$ 0.53

5,500/acre/week

Terminate $1000

$0.55

5,000/acre/week 15%

$500

Late

$ 0.77

5,100/acre/week

Terminate $1000

$0.70

4,700/acre/week 15%

$500
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Please choose only one
option:

Contract A

Volume
Penalty
(pounds/ acre/
week)
2,200/acre/week 15%

Certification
Cost

Contract B

$500

I will not
Choose
either A
or B

No Contract

SITUATION 3
Contract A
Delivery
Period

Price / Pound

Early
Peak
Late

Contract B

$ 0.74
$ 0.53

Volume
Penalty
(pounds/ acre/
week)
2,200/acre/week 5%
6,000/acre/week 5%

Certification Price
Cost
/
Pound
$1000
$0.62
$0.55
$1000

$ 0.70

5,100/acre/week 5%

$1000

Please choose only one
option:

Contract A

$0.77

No
Contract

Volume
Penalty Certification
(pounds/ acre/
Cost
week)
I will not
Choose
2,600/acre/week 15%
$500
either A
5,000/acre/week 15%
$500
or B
4,300/acre/week 15%
$500

Contract B

No Contract

SITUATION 4
Contract A
Delivery Period

Price /
Pound

Early

Contract B

No
Contract

$ 0.68

Volume
Penalty Certification
(pounds/ acre/
Cost
week)
2,400/acre/week 10%
$500

Price
/
Pound
$0.62

Peak

$ 0.55

6,000/acre/week 10%

$500

$0.53

Volume
Penalty Certification
(pounds/ acre/
Cost
week)
I will not
Choose
2,600/acre/week 15%
$1000
either A
5,500/acre/week 15%
$1000
or B

Late

$ 0.77

5,100/acre/week 10%

$500

$0.84

4,300/acre/week 15%
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Please choose only one option:

Contract A

Contract B

$1000
No Contract

SITUATION 5
Contract A
Delivery
Period

Price /
Pound

Early

Contract B

No
Contract

Volume
Penalty
(pounds/ acre/
week)
2,200/acre/week 5%

Certification
Cost

$ 0.68

Volume
Penalty
Certification Price
(pounds/ acre/
Cost
/
week)
Pound
2,600/acre/week Terminate $1000
$0.62

Peak

$ 0.53

5,000/acre/week Terminate $1000

$0.58

6,000/acre/week 5%

$0

Late

$ 0.70

4,700/acre/week Terminate $1000

$0.84

4,300/acre/week 5%

$0

Please choose only one option:

Contract A

Contract B

$0

No Contract

I will not
Choose
either A
or B

SITUATION 6
Contract A

Contract B

No
Contract

Delivery Period

Price /
Pound

Early

$ 0.68

Volume
Penalty
Certification Price
(pounds/ acre/
Cost
/
week)
Pound
2,600/acre/week Terminate $1000
$0.74

Peak

$ 0.58

6,000/acre/week Terminate $1000

$0.58

Volume
Penalty Certification
(pounds/ acre/
Cost
week)
I will not
Choose
2,400/acre/week 10%
$1000
either A
5,500/acre/week 10%
$1000
or B

Late

$ 0.84

4,300/acre/week Terminate $1000

$0.70

4,700/acre/week 10%

Please choose only

Contract A

Contract B

$1000

No Contract

one option:
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Finally, we would like to know a bit more about you
D1. Gender:
Male
Female
D2. Age Group:
1525

2635

3645

4655

D3. What is your annual household income?
Under $ 15,000
$ 15,000 - $ 24,999
$ 25,000 - $34,999
$ 35,000 - $49,999

5665

66+

$ 50,000 – 74,999
$ 75,000 – 99,999
$ 100,000 - $125,000
Above $ 125,000

D4. What percentage of your household income is your farm income?
Under 10%
50%-90%
10%-20%
More than 90%
20%-50%
D5. What is your education level?
Some classes of primary school
Completed primary school
Some classes of secondary school
Completed secondary school
Some classes of high school

Graduated high school
Completed technical school
Some college no degree
Completed college
Completed graduate school

D6. How many members are in the household, including you? ___________
D7. Are there any children under 18 in your household?
Yes
No
D8. What is your current marital status?
Married
Widow/widow
Divorce
er
d

Separated

D10. Do you have off farm employment?
No
Yes, but less than my farm
income

Yes, more than my farm income
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Never Married

Thank You!!
Please use the following space to express any comments/ questions you may have about
the survey.

Copyright © Michael Vassalos 2013
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Appendix 2: Mathematical Specification of the Economic Model for Chapter 4
The grower’s objective is to maximize net returns above selected variable costs less the
risk aversion coefficient multiplied by the variance of net returns and is given by:
A. 1
Subject to: land availability constraint, given by:
A. 2

⩝

, , .

Weekly labor resource limitation, given by:
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Contract choice given by:
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Either or constraints given by:
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Net returns by year are given by:
. 15
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Penalty Revenue given by:
. 17
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,

Expected profit balance is given by:
. 18
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Where, activities include:
: Expected net returns above
selected variable cost
, , , : Production of crop C,
under transplanting/planting
period D, harvesting period H
and soil depth S
, : Purchases of input I
: Net returns above selected
variable cost by year
, ,
, : Tomato sales
by size (medium, large, extralarge in pounds and sweet corn
sales in dozens of ears by week
and year respectively
CONTRSALESCONTR,WK,YR:
Large tomato sales requirement
under contract by week and year
when the volume requirements
are met
PENSALESCONTR,WK,YR: Large
tomato sales under contract if
volume requirements are not met,
by week and year
PICKCONTR, FAILCONTR,WK,PY,
SATISFYCONTR,WK,PY: Binary
integer decision variables

Coefficients include:
Φ: Risk aversion
Coefficient
,
, : Weekly price for
different tomato sizes in
$/pound and for sweet corn in
$ per ear
, , , , : Expected yield
of tomatoes by size in pounds
and of sweet corn by ears
: Available field
days per week
: Rotation matrix by
crop C
,
, : Weekly price in
$/pounds per tomato size and
in $/ear for sweet corn
" " : Ratio of total
acres allocated to depth S
CONTRPRICECONTR,WK: Price
paid to the grower if the
contract requirements are met
by contract and week
PENALTYPRICECONTR.WK:
Price paid to the grower if a
contract is selected and the
volume requirements are not
met
M: A large number (Big M)
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Indices include:
C: Crop
S: Soil depth
TS: Tomato Size
(medium, large, extralarge). There is only one
size for sweet corn.
H: Harvesting period (1
for sweet corn)
YR: Year
D: Transplant date for
tomatoes, Planting date
for sweet corn
WK: Week
I: Input
N: State of Nature
(13*38)
CONTR: Contract
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